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The earth and its inhabitants face significant environmental challenges. So far, the existing legal attempts 
have failed to address these challenges. The development of the last decades shows that the state of 
the environment has steadily worsened. Therefore, it is essential to explore new approaches. The 
concept of rights of nature offers a new legal perspective for creating a more effective approach to 
environmental regulation than traditional anthropocentric approaches. Rights of nature form part of a 
relatively new movement called Earth Jurisprudence which calls for a fundamental rethink of law. The 
concept of rights of nature requires that nature be accorded its own legal right. In order for rights of nature 
to be effective, their implementation must consider and overcome several procedural and substantive 
challenges. This dissertation explains the origins, form and nature of existing domestic rights of nature, 
and then critically analyses the main procedural and substantive challenges for their effective 
implementation in domestic legal frameworks. The most crucial procedural constraints are standing and 
representation of rights of nature whereas the most problematic substantive challenges are to define the 
scope of the right and to balance rights of nature with other rights. Having unpacked these challenges, 
the dissertation then explores possible solutions to overcome them. It comes to the conclusion that – 
amongst others - the key prerequisites for an effective implementation are to establish rights of nature as 
a constitutional right and to concisely define its content. Finally, the dissertation provides a set of 
guidelines for effectively implementing rights of nature into a domestic legal regime as well as a proposal 
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The current state of the environment is shocking. The developments of the last decades show a 
tremendous increase of environmental destruction.1 We are heading toward a major planetary 
catastrophe. Climate change and loss of biodiversity – amongst others - are environmental challenges 
which threaten the earth and its inhabitants.2 The challenges are predominantly caused by human 
activities.3 From a global perspective, representative populations of mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians 
and fish have declined by 52 percent between 1970 and 2010.4 In other words, on average the species’ 
populations are only about half the size they were 40 years ago. Moreover, there are no signs that the 
decline will slow down.5 A massive climate change already took place and has major implications for 
human well-being.6 If human activities continue as previously, the global temperature will increase 1.8–
4°C by the end of this century.7 This will have massive consequences, especially for the most vulnerable, 
poor and disadvantaged people.8 The impact of climate change, pollution as well as unsustainable land 
and water use are the main drivers of land degradation. If the present trend continues, approximately 1.8 
billion people will be living in countries or regions with absolute water scarcity by 2025.9 In other words, 
the earth is at the tipping point in several significant areas.10 
 
Human influence on the environment has become so significant that many commentators are of the 
opinion the world has moved into a new geological period – the “Anthropocene”.11 Not only the current 
ecological period is anthropogenic. The law is also fundamentally based on an anthropocentric world 
view.12 The predominant anthropocentric approach is ultimately concerned with human beings and 
human good. Only in rare circumstances are nature and animals considered as relevant to law.13 Nature 
is defined as human property that may be used and exploited for human benefit.14 Based on the 
                                                                
1 Magallanes 2016 NZJPIL 2-3. 
2 Global Environment Outlook GEO5 6-7. 
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7 Global Environment Outlook GEO4 8. 
8 Global Environment Outlook GEO4 8. 
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10 Koons 2012 LoyLRev 357. 
11 Maloney & Siemen 2015 EELJ 7. 
12 Burdon “The Great Jurisprudence” in Burdon Exploring Wild Law 61. 
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anthropocentric approach, the past fifty years have seen various efforts to respond to the ecological crisis. 
However, the natural world continues to deteriorate.15 The existing legal systems are not able to protect 
the earth and its inhabitants.16 During the last few decades, a remarkable body of environmental laws, 
protocols and frameworks has been adopted around the world – on both national and international level. 
However, despite the good intentions behind the environmental provisions, most of them have failed to 
fulfil their objectives.17 In general, environmental law and governance has mostly been ineffective.18 The 
existing institutions, especially states and the organisations through which they act, are not able to 
respond promptly to the challenges we are facing.19 International Organisations like the UNEP (United 
Nations Environmental Programme) neither have the capacity nor the authority to challenge the immense 
environmental problems.20 International environmental laws are often the result of substantial 
compromise, are usually soft-law and their enforcement is limited.21 The states as predominant role 
players in environmental governance are regularly unwilling to endorse a stronger form of sustainability.22 
Moreover, many states are unable to participate in environmental governance or are incapable of 
implementing and enforcing environmental laws.23 In short, the actions of the international community 
and national governments have not found adequate responses to the tremendous threats. 
 
In light of the current situation and the failing anthropocentric approach, it is essential for environmental 
law governance to think about new attempts to better protect the environment and its inhabitants through 
new legal approaches.24 Most governments still favour a combination of new technology and better 
application of existing regulatory systems.25 However, there are other approaches available to respond 
to the environmental crisis. The theory underlying this dissertation is a relatively new movement or 
philosophy termed “Earth Jurisprudence”. Earth Jurisprudence is an approach which can develop suitable 
solutions to protect the environment. The approach is based on the premise that the well-being of earth 
and all its habitants requires a fundamental rethinking of law and governance.26 In contrast to the 
predominant anthropocentric approach, Earth Jurisprudence favours a shift in thinking from a purely 
                                                                
15 Maloney & Siemen 2015 EELJ 7. 
16 Cullinan “Earth Jurisprudence: From Colonization to Participation” in Starke & Mastny State of the World – Transforming 
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17 Rühs & Jones 2016 Sustainability 1-2. 
18 Kotze 2014 JERL 141. 
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22 Kotze 2014 JERL 144. 
23 Sands Principles of International Environmental Law 92. 
24 Laitos “Rules of law for use and nonuse of nature” in Voigt Rule of Law for Nature 215. 
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human-centred to an earth-centred system of law and governance.27 It suggests an approach to law 
which seeks to maintain an appropriate natural balance for all life on earth.28 
 
An essential element of Earth Jurisprudence is the legal recognition of rights of nature.29 The recognition 
requires that nature has its own legal rights. In the last decade, the idea that nature possesses inalienable 
rights has evolved from a theoretical concept to reality in several countries. In 2008, for instance, Ecuador 
became the first country to constitutionally guarantee rights of nature.30 However, there are many practical 
and theoretical problems to be solved regarding the effective implementation of such rights. Procedural 
as well as substantive constraints hamper the effective use of rights of nature. So far, much has been 
written about the ethical arguments regarding rights of nature. However, only a few studies exist focussing 
on their actual implementation.31  
 
1.2 Scope and Purpose/Objective 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to determine the core content of rights of nature, to tackle existing 
problems relating to the implementation of rights of nature in domestic legal frameworks and propose 
possible solutions thereto. The main objective is to develop a way to effectively implement rights of nature 
through domestic legal frameworks. This dissertation focuses on the domestic scale because the 
domestic implementation of rights of nature appears to be the most effective option. The dissertation aims 
to provide a set of guidelines for effectively implementing rights of nature into a domestic legal regime. It 
illustrates that rights of nature should be implemented as a constitutional rights norm and finally proposes 
a wording for a domestic constitutional rights of nature norm. 
 
1.3 Structure and Methodology 
 
The dissertation undertakes a critical desk-top study on implemented rights of nature. It seeks to draw 
from the experience of existing domestic rights of nature in order to identify and analyse the main 
challenges facing the implementation of such a right. Having unpacked these challenges, it then seeks 
to explore possible solutions to overcoming them. This desk-top study considers and compares 
implemented rights of nature, relevant laws, theories, jurisprudence and literature. This will provide the 
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basis to examine the concept of rights of nature. It also lays the groundwork to identify, categorize and 
analyse the value of and main areas of concern regarding rights of nature as well as to examine ways to 
overcome them. For the purpose of critical analysis, this dissertation reflects on implemented rights of 
nature and other legal sources. 
 
The dissertation is divided into five main parts. Part 2 explains the origins, form and nature of rights of 
nature. It examines how rights of nature are embedded in the broader theory of Earth Jurisprudence, how 
the rights evolved and what the content of rights of nature is. In order to determine the scope and 
nature/form of rights of nature, rights of nature in Ecuador´s Constitution32, in different ordinances of the 
United States of America33 and in the TUTOHU WHAKATUPA Agreement34 of New Zealand will be 
analysed. These examples of codified rights of nature have been selected because they each represent 
different approaches to how rights of nature can be implemented. The three examples of rights of nature 
will be termed “existing domestic rights of nature” throughout the dissertation. Furthermore, the 
dissertation uses general categories of the theory of rights to determine the nature of the existing 
domestic rights of nature. Using Hohfeld´s theory of rights as an orientation, the dissertation classifies 
implemented rights of nature. 
 
For the purpose of a critical review, Part 3 analyses the value of and the constraints facing the 
implementation of rights of nature. It begins with a critical evaluation of the need for rights of nature. 
Subsequently, an in-depth examination of the relevant literature and jurisprudence identifies the main 
areas of concern of the existing domestic rights of nature. The concerns are categorized in three major 
procedural and three major substantive problem areas. Each of the identified and categorized constraints 
will be analysed in turn. 
 
Part 4 then examines ways to overcome the constraints facing the implementation of rights of nature. It 
will be considered on which level rights of nature should be implemented – comparing hard law to soft 
law, international to domestic implementation as well as different levels of domestic implementation. 
Additionally, Part 4 examines general requirements for a constitutional rights of nature norm. Finally, this 
                                                                
32 Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, 2008. 
33 Local Law NO. 3-2011, Town of Wales, New York, 2011; Nottingham Water Rights and Local Self Government Ordinance, 
Town of Nottingham, New Hampshire, 2008; Ordinance to amend the Town Code of Halifax, Town of Halifax, Virginia, 2008. 
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part will discuss how to effectively resolve the main procedural and substantive constraints of the existing 
domestic rights of nature. In order to do so, the dissertation draws mainly from relevant literature on 
constitutional rights. 
 
Finally, Part 5 briefly summarises the outcomes of the dissertation. Subsequently, the dissertation offers 
a guideline of requirements for the implementation of rights of nature on a domestic level. Based on the 
main outcomes the dissertation furthermore proposes a possible wording for a rights of nature provision 
as a constitutional rights norm. The guidelines for the effective domestic implementation of rights of nature 
and the draft formulation of a constitutional rights of nature clause are included as Annex 1 and Annex 2.  
 
2. The Concept of Rights of Nature 
 
2.1 Earth Jurisprudence and the Evolution of Rights of Nature 
 
To understand rights of nature it is essential to briefly examine Earth Jurisprudence and explain the role 
of rights of nature as part of the philosophy of Earth Jurisprudence.  
 
Earth Jurisprudence is based on the premise that the well-being of earth and its habitants requires a 
fundamental rethinking of law and of governance.35 The term was established by Thomas Berry36 who 
suggested that “Earth needs a new jurisprudence” and the term “Earth Jurisprudence” was coined.37 As 
a philosophy of law and human governance, Earth Jurisprudence analyses the predominant 
anthropocentric approach and aims to overcome the problems posed by it.38 In contrast to the 
anthropocentric approach, Earth Jurisprudence favours a shift in thinking from a purely human-centred 
to an earth-centred system of law and governance.39 Advocates for Earth Jurisprudence are of the opinion 
that the primary cause of the ecological crisis is anthropocentrism.40 Anthropocentrism stipulates that 
humans are more important than the rest of the natural world.41 It underpins the governance structures 
                                                                
35 Koons 2009 PSELW 1. 
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38 Burdon 2012 AJLP 30. 
39 Maloney 2015 GJLHD 43. 
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of contemporary industrial societies – economics, education, religion and law. The anthropocentric world 
view promotes the belief that the natural world is a collection of objects for human use.42  
 
Earth Jurisprudence follows a different approach. Central to it is the understanding that all things are 
interconnected and that humans do not stand above of the earth system but are rather part of it.43 Earth 
Jurisprudence acknowledges that long-term human well-being depends mainly on the extent to which 
humans are capable of adjusting to their habitat. This eco-centric approach ideally ensures that human 
beings behave as “good citizens”. Consequently, human governance systems must rule in a way which 
does not lead to substantial degradation of the earth.44  
 
The judges Radhakrishnan and Prasad of the Supreme Court of India summarize the necessary shift 
away from anthropocentric principles as the following: “Environmental justice could be achieved only if 
we drift away from the principle of anthropocentric to ecocentric. Many of our principles like sustainable 
development, polluter-pays principle, inter-generational equity have their roots in anthropocentric 
principles. Anthropocentrism is always human interest focussed and non-human has only instrumental 
value to humans”.45 In their view humans always take priority over non-humans in current legal systems. 
Therefore, the judges favour an eco-centric approach which places nature in its centre. This approach 
follows the idea that human interest does not take automatic precedence and humans have obligations 
towards non-humans independently of human interest.46 The judges Radhakrishnan and Prasad 
conclude that ecocentrism is, in contrast to anthropocentrism, nature-centred and that nature includes 
both humans and non-humans.47 
 
Earth Jurisprudence is based on several principles.48 Cormac Cullinan49 determines the principles of 
Earth Jurisprudence in detail. A critical principal is that the universe is the primary lawgiver. Earth 
Jurisprudence stipulates that the universe is the highest authority for human society not human laws. 50 
                                                                
42 Maloney 2015 GJLHD 43. 
43 Cullinan “Governing People as Members of the Earth Community” in Prugh & Renner State of the World - Governing for 
Sustainability 3. 
44 Cullinan “Governing People as Members of the Earth Community” in Prugh & Renner State of the World - Governing for 
Sustainability 4. 
45 Section 14 T.N Godavarman Thirumulpad Vs. Union of India & Others, 2012. 
46 Section 14 T.N Godavarman Thirumulpad Vs. Union of India & Others, 2012. 
47 Section 14 T.N Godavarman Thirumulpad Vs. Union of India & Others, 2012. 
48 Cullinan 2011 IUCN AELJ 42. 
49 Cormac Cullinan is an environmental attorney and author based in Cape Town, South Africa. He is also one of the most 
important theoretical icons of Earth Jurisprudence. 
50 Cullinan “Earth Jurisprudence: From Colonization to Participation” in Starke & Mastny State of the World – Transforming 





This requires looking at law from the perspective of the whole Earth community.51 Another principle states 
“that the Earth community and all the beings that constitute it have fundamental “rights”, including the 
right to exist, to have a habitat or a place to be, and to participate in the evolution of the community”.52 
Human acts or laws which violate these rights are illegitimate and unlawful.53 The concept of Earth 
Jurisprudence further entails that “humans must adapt their legal, political, economic, and social systems 
to be consistent with the fundamental laws or principles that govern how the universe functions and to 
guide humans to live in accordance with these”.54 This means that human governance systems must take 
into account the interests of the whole Earth community at all times.55 
 
The most important principle and the one this dissertation will focus on is the legal recognition of rights 
of nature.56 Berry argued that “nature´s rights should be the central issue in any […] discussion of the 
legal context of our society”.57 Rights of nature can be seen as an important subset of the broader Earth 
Jurisprudence philosophy.58 They seek to regulate human conduct in a manner which contributes to the 
health and integrity of the earth instead of dominating and exploiting it.59 Anthropocentric laws´ define 
nature as human property and all value and rights are placed on human beings.60 The concept of rights 
of nature is based on a different perspective. Natural entities should possess rights in the same way that 
human beings possess rights - simply by virtue of their existence.61 The legal status of nature should be 
regardless of any claims people might have to a right to property. Rights of nature are supposed to include 
the right to exist, to choose a habitat or a place to be and to participate in the evolution of the Earth 
community.62 Granting these rights requires a radical rethinking of the role of our anthropocentric legal 
system. It is a way of rebalancing the relation between humans and nature and recognizes that nature 
deserves to be valued for its own inherent worth.63  
 
                                                                
51 Cullinan “A History of Wild Law“ in Burdon Exploring Wild Law 13. 
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54 Cullinan “Earth Jurisprudence: From Colonization to Participation” in Starke & Mastny State of the World – Transforming 
Cultures – From Consumerism to Sustainability 144. 
55 Cullinan “Earth Jurisprudence: From Colonization to Participation” in Starke & Mastny State of the World – Transforming 
Cultures – From Consumerism to Sustainability 144. 
56 Berry The Great Work: Our Way Into the Future 8. 
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The idea of moving beyond the anthropocentric approach to improve the treatment of animals and other 
species is not new.64 The development of the concept of rights of nature began several decades ago. 
The concept is built on the cosmologies of many indigenous people, the customary practices of rural 
people in Africa, India and elsewhere as well as on the writing of scholars´ like Aldo Leopold65 and 
Thomas Berry.66  
 
Already in 1949, Aldo Leopold argued for a new approach. Leopold stated that “[t]here is as yet no ethic 
dealing with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it”.67 He concluded 
that “[t]he extension of ethics to this third element in human environment is […] an evolutionary possibility 
and an ecological necessity”.68 A few years later, in 1972, Professor Christopher Stone raised the 
question whether trees should have legal standing. He stated: “Each time there is a movement to confer 
rights onto some new entity, the proposal is bound to sound odd or frightening or laughable. This is partly 
because until the rightless thing receives its rights, we cannot see it as anything but a thing for the use 
of “us” – those who are holding rights at the time”.69 The US Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas 
argued similarly in the Sierra Club v. Morton (1972) case. According to his dissenting opinion, natural 
objects should have their own standing in order to sue for their own protection.70 Different jurisprudents, 
such as Berry and Cullinan, developed further Leopold´s and Stone´s ideas. Berry, for instance, argued 
in the 1980´s that: “[T]he naive assumption that the natural world exists solely to be possessed and used 
by humans for their unlimited advantage cannot be accepted […] To achieve a viable human-Earth 
community, a new legal system must take as its primary task to articulate the conditions for the integral 
functioning of the Earth process, with special reference to a mutually enhancing human-Earth 
relationship”.71 
 
A few decades after its theoretical introduction, lawmakers are beginning to take the assumptions of the 
above elaborated jurisprudents seriously.72 Rights of nature are simultaneously developing around the 
globe.73 They are incorporated in jurisdictions in Ecuador and Bolivia as well as in the United States and 
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New Zealand.74 Moreover, a growing international movement of people and organisations is advocating 
for an earth-centred law and governance approach.75 In 2010, the UDRME (Universal Declaration of the 
Rights of Mother Earth) was proclaimed at the World Peoples` Conference on Climate Change and the 
Rights of Mother Earth.76 The declaration acknowledges that Earth is an indivisible, living community of 
interrelated and interdependent beings with inherent rights.77 The UDRME is used as guidance in 
numerous initiatives and organisations all around the world.78 Rights of nature were also addressed on 
various other occasions and in a variety of documents, such as Supreme Court decisions in India79, Pope 
Francis` new encyclical80 and UN General Assembly resolutions81. In short, the concept of rights of nature 
has been widely acknowledged. But what exactly are rights of nature? 
 
2.2 Concept of Rights of Nature 
 
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to examine the background, the scope and the 
nature/form of the existing domestic rights of nature. Rights of nature have been practically implemented 
of the local, national and international level. Since the dissertation concentrates on the national 
implementation of rights of nature, this section analyses three main examples of implemented rights on 
a domestic level – Ecuador´s Constitution82, different ordinances of the US83 and the TUTOHU 
WHAKATUPA Agreement of New Zealand84. Despite some differences between these codifications it will 
be shown that the background, the basic scope and the nature/form of the implemented rights are similar.  
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2.2.1 Background to Existing Domestic Rights of Nature 
 
Ecuador´s Constitution, various ordinances of the US (United States of America) and the TUTOHU 
WHAKATUPA Agreement were established since 2006. Most of the implemented rights are based on 
similar foundations and objectives: They seek to protect the environment from economic interests and 
bad governance. 
 
In the US, several communities passed local ordinances which provide community self-determination and 
rights of nature.85 The first appearance of codified rights of nature anywhere in the world was on the 
municipal level in Tamaqua Borough, USA, in 2006.86 Four years later, in 2010, the city of Pittsburgh 
became the first US city adopting a rights of nature ordinance. So far, municipalities in Ohio87, 
Pennsylvania88, New Hampshire89, Maine90, New York91, Virginia92, New Mexico93, Maryland94 and 
California95 have adopted at least one ordinance which proclaims rights for their local environment. The 
state Colorado intends to draft an amendment to the state Constitution that introduces state-wide rights 
for nature.96 All ordinances have similar origins and backgrounds: The communities fight practices which 
endanger the environment and human well-being. The ordinances serve as legal tools protecting the 
communities. Corporations and a state which tolerates environmental degradation are perceived as main 
enemies.97 The ordinance of the Tamaqua Borough states: “Tamaqua Borough has been rendered 
powerless by the state and federal government to prohibit the land application of sewage sludge by 
persons that comply with all applicable laws and regulations. In order to protect the health, safety, and 
welfare of the residents of Tamaqua Borough, the soil, groundwater, and surface water, the environment 
and its flora and fauna, and the practice of sustainable agriculture, the Borough finds it necessary to ban 
corporations and other limited liability entities from engaging in the land application of sewage sludge”.98 
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The specific reason for the introduction of the ordinances differs from community to community. The 
ordinance of the Tamaqua Borough99 fights against the application of sewage sludge whilst the ordinance 
of the city of Pittsburgh100 addresses fracking. The ordinance of the city of Pittsburgh, for instance, states: 
“The City Council of Pittsburgh finds that the commercial extraction of natural gas in the urban 
environment of Pittsburgh poses a significant threat to the health, safety, and welfare of residents and 
neighbourhoods within the City. […] Thus, the City Council hereby adopts this ordinance, which bans 
commercial extraction of Marcellus Shale natural gas within the City of Pittsburgh, creates a Bill of Rights 
for the residents and communities of the City, and removes certain legal powers from gas extraction 
corporations operating within the City of Pittsburgh”.101 Other ordinances are primarily focused on 
water102, mining103 or sustainability104. 
 
Shortly after the first legal appearance of rights of nature in US ordinances, Ecuador became the world´s 
first country to codify rights of nature in constitutional history.105 In 2008, a majority of citizens approved 
the new Constitution106 which codifies rights of nature. The seventh chapter in Part 2 of the Constitution 
is dedicated to “Rights of Nature”. Like the US municipalities, the Ecuadorian government aimed at a 
better protection of the environment. Art. 71 of Ecuador´s Constitution stipulates that “[t]he State will 
motivate natural and juridical persons as well as collectives to protect nature; it will promote respect 
towards all the elements that form an ecosystem”. Art. 72 of Ecuador´s Constitution further states: “Nature 
has the right to restoration. This integral restoration is independent of the obligation on natural and 
juridical persons or the State to indemnify the people and the collectives that depend on the natural 
systems. In the cases of severe or permanent environmental impact, including the ones caused by the 
exploitation on non-renewable natural resources, the State will establish the most efficient mechanisms 
for the restoration, and will adopt the adequate measures to eliminate or mitigate the harmful 
environmental consequences.” Art. 73 of Ecuador´s Constitution finally lays down that “[t]he State will 
apply precaution and restriction measures in all the activities that can lead to the extinction of species, 
the destruction of the ecosystems or the permanent alteration of the natural cycles”. The rights especially 
intend to protect the environment against corporations which have been using Ecuador as a dumping 
ground and the oil industry which caused serious degradation.107  
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The TUTOHU WHAKATUPA Agreement108 was concluded in 2012. It is a contract between the 
Whanganui Iwi, the indigenous community that has historically inhabited the Whanganui river, and the 
Crown. The Crown fulfils a number of important political, legal and symbolic functions in NZ (New 
Zealand). Its definition is obtuse and its meanings vary according to the context.109 As a relic of British 
colonisation, the concept of the Crown stands for the New Zealand government acting as a legal entity.110 
In general, the Crown is a corporation that represents the legal embodiment of executive governance. 
The TUTOHU WHAKATUPA Agreement recognises the Whanganui river as a living entity with its own 
rights.111 The TUTOHU WHAKATUPA Agreement is the result of the longest-standing legal dispute in 
New Zealand´s history and the desire of the Whanganui Iwi to protect their sacred river.112 In contrast to 
the ordinances in the US and the Constitution in Ecuador, the motivation for the TUTOHU WHAKATUPA 
Agreement was not the fight against corporations. In fact, the motivation was the colonial history and the 
fight against a colonial government. The Whanganui Iwi claimed that the Crown did not respect their 
granted rights regarding the river.113 The Agreement recognizes the special relationship between the 
Whanganui Iwi and the Whanganui river: “Whanganui Iwi have common links in two principal ancestors, 
Paerangi and Ruatipua.  Ruatipua draws lifeforce from the headwaters of the Whanganui River on Mount 
Tongariro and its tributaries which stretch down to the sea. The connection of the tributaries to form the 
Whanganui River is mirrored by the interconnection through whakapapa of the descendants of Ruatipua 
and Paerangi. […] Whanganui Iwi view the Whanganui River as a living being, Te Awa Tupua; an 
indivisible whole incorporating its tributaries and all its physical and metaphysical elements from the 
mountains to the sea. The enduring concept of Te Awa Tupua - the inseparability of the people and River 
– underpins the desire of Whanganui Iwi to care, protect, manage and use the Whanganui River through 
the kawa and tikanga maintained by the descendants of Ruatipua and Paerangi”.114  
 
In short, existing domestic rights of nature have a similar background. They mainly seek to protect the 
environment against corporations, a state which does not protect the environment and/or the colonial 
history.  
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2.2.2 The Scope of the Existing Domestic Rights of Nature 
 
This part examines and compares the scope of the existing domestic rights of nature from two 
perspectives. Firstly, it considers their scope of protection and application. Secondly, it reflects on the 
issue of standing.  
 
2.2.2.1 Scope of Rights 
 
Rights of nature in Ecuador´s Constitution, in the ordinances of the US municipalities and in the TUTOHU 
WHAKATUPA Agreement have a similar scope and structure. The granted rights to the natural 
environment contain two different claims: a moral obligation to respect nature´s value and a legal claim. 
All mentioned codifications aim to protect the environment as well as the humans who live in the 
environment.115 However, their scope of protection and application differs. Rights of nature in Ecuador´s 
Constitution have a very wide scope of protection whilst the scope of the US ordinances and the TUTOHU 
WHAKATUPA Agreement is more specific. 
 
Ecuador´s Constitution treats environment as a right-bearing entity equal to humans.116 Art. 71 - Art. 74 
of Ecuador´s Constitution are dedicated to ensuring substantive rights of nature. Art. 71 of the 
Constitution stipulates: “Nature or Pachamama, where life is reproduced and exists, has the right to exist, 
persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions and its processes in evolution”. 
Hence, Art. 71 of Ecuador´s Constitution lays down that nature´s right entails four things: respect for 
nature´s existence, maintenance, integrity and regeneration.117 Even though the Constitution does not 
define “nature”, the term accrues a wide scope since “nature” is an extremely broad concept.118  
 
The scope of protection of the ordinances in US municipalities is less broad. The scope is often 
determined by a standardized list of rights. In many of the post-2010 Pennsylvania ordinances, the 
following standard formulation is used:119 “Rights of Natural Communities. Natural communities and 
ecosystems, including, but not limited to, wetlands, streams, rivers, aquifers, and other water systems, 
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possess inalienable and fundamental rights to exist and flourish within the City […]”.120 The scope of 
rights of nature in US ordinances is therefore not clearly limited to include water systems only. However, 
water systems are specifically listed as nature to be protected. The key element of the US ordinances is 
the right of life. The rights of nature are part of a package of rights. The right of access and use of natural 
resources as well as the right to self-government often are also part of the local regulations.121 This is 
similar to the Ecuadorian Constitution which also offers a package of rights. 
 
The TUTOHU WHAKATUPA Agreement is, in contrast, more specific and limits its scope to the 
Whanganui river. Rights of nature are only granted to the “Te Awa Tupua”.122 The Agreement defines Te 
Awa Tupua as the whole river: “Whanganui Iwi and the Crown have reached agreement on the following 
key elements of the Te Awa Tupua ("whole of River")”123. This includes all elements of the river, such as 
the river bed, its length and trajectory.124 The Te Awa Tupua also compromises the fundamental 
connection between the well-being of the people and the river itself.125 
 
2.2.2.2 Standing and Representation  
 
Ecuador´s Constitution, ordinances of US municipalities and the TUTOHU WHAKATUPA Agreement also 
have a similar approach to the important issue of standing. The rights of nature not only aim to protect 
nature but they also explicitly list nature, natural communities, ecosystems and rivers as legal persons 
and accord them legal standing. Central to the provisions is the idea that nature has standing to initiate 
legal actions in its own name and for its own benefit.126 Despite the general common approach, the 
specific provisions governing standing and representation of rights of nature are differently formulated. 
Ecuador´s Constitution has a general approach in respect of its standing. In contrast, the ordinances of 
US municipalities and the TUTOHU WHAKATUPA Agreement are more specific regarding the question 
as to who has standing and who may represent rights of nature. 
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In general, Ecuador´s Constitution grants “nature” its own rights.127 However, the Constitution does not 
regulate clearly who may seek action for the protection of nature´s right before court.128 Art. 71 of the 
Constitution says that “every person, people, community or nationality, will be able to demand the 
recognitions of rights for nature before the public organisms”. The wording of the Constitution suggests 
that a wider range of people may represent nature in legal disputes.129 Since there are no clear guidelines 
for the representation of nature, courts will be required to define them through their jurisprudence.130  
 
The ordinances in the US grant natural communities and ecosystems, such as wetlands and rivers, 
“inalienable and fundamental rights” and standing. However, most of the ordinances limit the number of 
people who possess legal standing to enforce rights on behalf of the natural communities and ecosystems 
to the residents of the city or the borough.131 Moreover, some ordinances have expressly removed the 
rights of corporations to challenge rights of nature and deny corporations the legal authority to do so.132 
The ordinance of the city of Pittsburgh, for instance, stipulates: “Corporations in violation of the prohibition 
against natural gas extraction, or seeking to engage in natural gas extraction shall not have the rights of 
"persons" afforded by the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions, nor shall those corporations be 
afforded the protections of the commerce or contracts clauses within the United States Constitution or 
corresponding sections of the Pennsylvania Constitution. […] Corporations engaged in the extraction of 
natural gas shall not possess the authority or power to enforce State or federal preemptive law against 
the people of the City of Pittsburgh, or to challenge or overturn municipal ordinances adopted by the City 
Council of Pittsburgh”.133 
 
The TUTOHU WHAKATUPA Agreement is even more specific than the municipal ordinances in the US. 
It clarifies that the “Te Awa Tupua” is recognized as a legal entity.134 The legal standing is only granted to 
the river as a legal entity and not to nature as such.135 In other words, only the river has awarded rights 
of personhood.136 The agreement stipulates that “the creation of a legal personality for the River is 
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intended to […] enable [it] to have legal standing in its own rights”.137 The river as a legal person with its 
own rights may potentially bring claims against anyone for damages of its physical and spiritual 
wellbeing.138 Thereby, the river acts through its guardians. The TUTOHU WHAKATUPA Agreement 
contains a guardianship approach which is termed “Te Pou Tupua” (guardian). The Te Pou Tupua is 
formed of two representatives, one appointed by the Crown and one by “all iwi with interest in the 
Whanganui River”.139 The guardians are bound to act on behalf of the river and its interest.140 
 
2.2.3 The Nature/Form of Existing Domestic Rights of Nature 
 
To identify the form/nature of the rights of nature this section categorises the existing domestic rights of 
nature. This section draws particularly from Hohfeld´s analysis of legal rights as a means of 
categorisation. Although the Hohfeldian scheme is controversial, it has the advantage of granting as much 
clarity as possible.141 Hohfelds concept of rights is based on the kinds of relations a right may provide. It 
generally distinguishes between four types of jural relations: claim-rights, liberty-rights, powers and 
immunities.142 The four types cannot be delimited exactly and a right may consist of a cluster of rights.143 
Hohfeld characterises a right as a relation between parties.144 Every type of right has a correlative which 
describes the position of the other party in the relationship.145 According to Hohfeld, the following 
correlatives exist: claim-right and duty, liberty-right and no-right, power and liability as well as immunity 
and disability.146 Hohfeld also uses opposites to distinguish the four types of rights. Opposites describe 
the condition contrary to the type of right in question: claim-right and no-right, liberty-right and duty, power 
and disability, as well as immunity and liability.147 
 
The existing domestic rights of nature can be categorized as a mix of positive and negative claim-rights. 
A claim-right is a right entitling the right holder to claim the corresponding duty from the obligated person. 
The content of claim-rights can differ in many aspects. A useful distinction is that drawn between positive 
and negative claim rights. Positive claim-rights are rights entitling to specific services and goods. They 
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are termed positive because they contain a positive response on those who owe a duty. Positive claim-
rights can be, for instance, the right to receive compensation and the right to be protected.148 Negative 
claim-rights are rights to non-interference. They are termed negative because they only require restraint 
or omission instead of an action.149  
 
Ecuador´s Constitution contains a mix of positive and negative claim-rights. Art. 71 of Ecuador´s 
Constitution includes a negative claim-right. It grants the right to not interfere in the basic processes of 
nature. The Constitution stipulates that “nature […] has the right to exist, persist, maintain and regenerate 
its vital cycles, structure, functions and its processes in evolution”.150 In doing so, third parties are obliged 
not to disrupt the fundamental functions and processes of nature. At the same time, Art. 72 of Ecuador´s 
Constitution formulates a positive claim-right: “Nature has the right to restoration”. This formulation 
establishes a positive obligation on other parties to compensate damages to the environment. 
 
The US ordinances also grant negative and positive claim-rights. The Pittsburgh ordinance, for instance, 
puts the obligation on other parties not to restrict the existence of ecosystems: “Natural communities and 
ecosystems […] possess inalienable and fundamental rights to exist and flourish”.151 The ordinance of 
the Tamaqua Borough is formulated slightly differently: “It shall be unlawful for any corporation or its 
directors, officers, owners, or managers to interfere with the existence and flourishing of natural 
communities or ecosystems, or to cause damage to those natural communities and ecosystems”.152 The 
duty requires a conduct which does not endanger natural communities and ecosystems. Activities that 
interfere with or violate these rights are prohibited. Furthermore, the ordinances contain positive claim-
rights in form of compensation. They contain rights entitling to claim damages in order to provide for the 
restoration of nature.153 Additionally, US ordinances grant certain claims to natural communities and 
ecosystems. The Pittsburgh ordinance, for example, states that “all residents, natural communities and 
ecosystems in Pittsburgh possess a fundamental and inalienable right to sustainably access, use, 
consume, and preserve water drawn from natural water cycles”.154 
 
Finally, the TUTOHU WHAKATUPA Agreement also includes positive and negative claim-rights. The 
wording of the Agreement is not as explicit as Ecuador´s Constitution or most of the US ordinances. 
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However, an interpretation of the contract demonstrates that it contains both rights. The negative claim-
right may be derived from the key principle of the Record of Understanding of the TUTOHU WHAKATUPA 
Agreement: “Te Mana o Te Awa - recognising, promoting and protecting the health and wellbeing of the 
River and its status as Te Awa Tupua”. The principle “Te Mana o Te Awa” acknowledges that the 
Whanganui river has its right to exist and that activities which violate these rights are prohibited. In 
addition, the contract establishes claims against the Crown and private entities to compensate for 
damages to the physical and spiritual wellbeing of the river.155 Hence, it also provides positive claim-
rights. 
 
2.3 Summary of Key Lessons 
 
Earth Jurisprudence provides a fundamentally different approach compared to the predominant 
anthropocentric world view. Central to the governance approach is the idea that all things are 
interconnected and that humans do not stand above of the system earth but are part of it. The most 
important subset of Earth Jurisprudence is the legal recognition of rights of nature. The concept of rights 
of nature acknowledges that nature possesses inalienable rights by granting natural entities legal claims. 
The main idea is that nature has standing to initiate legal actions in its own name and for its own benefit. 
The analysis of three main examples of implemented rights of nature on a domestic level – Ecuador´s 
Constitution, different ordinances of the US and the TUTOHU WHAKATUPA Agreement of New Zealand 
– shows that the main purpose of rights of nature is the protection of the environment and the humans 
who live in it. Their aim is to protect the environment from detrimental economic interests and bad 
governance. The existing domestic rights of nature can be categorized as a mix of positive and negative 
claim-rights: they stipulate both a positive duty to pay compensation for damages as well as the negative 
duty not to interfere in nature´s rights. However, the existing domestic rights of nature not only differ in 
the manner they are implemented – constitution, ordinance and agreement. They are also distinguished 
by their scope and the way nature is legally represented. Ecuador´s Constitution contains a wide 
approach by granting national wide nature rights which may be represented by a wide range of people. 
The ordinances of the US have a more restricted approach. They only apply locally, grant rights to entities 
according to a standardized list and the representation of the rights is limited. The scope of the TUTOHU 
WHAKATUPA Agreement is restricted even further, namely to the Whanganui river. The river may be 
legally represented only by specified representatives. 
 
                                                                





3. Opportunities and Constraints Associated with Existing Domestic Rights of Nature 
 
Valuable lessons can be garnered from an evaluation of the experience of jurisdictions which have 
already sought to implement rights of nature in a domestic context. The existing domestic rights of nature 
provisions offer distinct advantages but also face various practical and theoretical problems. Part 3 
analyses the main opportunities and constraints associated with existing domestic rights of nature. Firstly, 
section 3.1 determines the value of rights of nature. This analysis is particularly important because the 
implementation of rights of nature is only useful if they expand the protection of the environment. Section 
3.2 then identifies the main procedural and substantive constraints of the existing domestic rights of 
nature - focussing again on the constitutional rights in Ecuador, rights of nature in ordinances of the US 
and the TUTOHU WHAKATUPA Agreement of New Zealand.  
 
3.1 Opportunities Provided by Rights of Nature 
 
Rights of nature are often the target of criticism. Various commentators are of the opinion that a nature 
right approach does not further the goals of environmental protection compared to the existing legal 
systems.156 One point of criticism is that conventional legal notions can achieve the same results as rights 
of nature.157 The argument is based on the assumption that the real problem is not the legal concept itself 
but a lack of political will.158 Another point of critique is that Earth Jurisprudence only constitutes a “noble 
lie” and might not be the most effective strategy to face current challenges.159 However, the 
implementation of rights of nature appear to strengthen the protection of the environment. Rights of nature 
have specific advantages which are illustrated by two main aspects. Firstly, rights of nature provide a 
larger protection for nature than conventional legal approaches. Secondly, they promote a paradigm shift 
of perceptions in human society. 
 
3.1.1 Broader Environmental Protection 
 
A main failure of modern environmental laws is to not effectively stop environmental degradation and the 
forces driving it. Instead of reversing the evolution of degradation, the current legal systems appear to 
perpetuate legalizing pollution and unsustainable use of natural resources.160 Rights of nature add 
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important tools to the existing legal armoury of environmental law. They express values which extend the 
protection of the environment.  
 
3.1.1.1 Rights of Nature vs Sustainable Development 
 
Rights of nature formulate a higher standard of protection than previous environmental protection 
movements. The previous environmental protection movements have been mainly associated with the 
achievement of sustainable development.161 The concept of sustainable development is a concept which 
underpins the international and national attempts to deal with challenges like climate change, poverty 
and pollution.162 The concept calls for a convergence between three interrelated pillars or dimensions.163 
These pillars are economic development, social equity and environmental protection. The concept of 
sustainable development may be understood as a guiding principle, a process or a framework to balance 
those three dimensions.164  
 
The meaning of the term sustainable development has evolved constantly and was influenced by a 
number of UN (United Nations) summits on the international stage.165 The WCED (World Commission on 
Environment and Development) introduced a widely used definition of sustainable development when 
publishing the Brundtland Report in 1987.166 The report postulated that sustainable development is 
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs”.167 Five years later, the Rio Conference (United Conference on Environment 
and Development) strongly influenced the direction of sustainable development by establishing an 
emphasis on the environmental issues.168 A decade later, the WSSD (2002 World Summit on Sustainable 
Development) in Johannesburg brought along a shift from environmental issues toward social and 
economic development.169 The Rio+20 (United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development), held 
in Rio in 2012, confirmed the shift of the concept´s focus towards economic issues. Initiated by the Rio+20 
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Conference, the 2030 Agenda (2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development) introduced a set of 17 SDGs 
(Sustainable Development Goals) and changed the perception of sustainable development once again 
by laying down a vision of goal-orientated sustainable development through global partnership.170 
 
The concept of sustainable development has several shortcomings. Firstly, the above elaborated 
evolution of the concept of sustainable development shows that there is an ongoing dialogue about the 
content and the emphasis of the concept. Yet a fixed and clear definition of the concept of sustainable 
development does not exist.171 The term appears elusive. As a result, some observer’s even consider 
the term “sustainable development” to be meaningless as it can be redefined by anyone.172 Secondly, 
the concept of sustainable development fails to articulate clear objectives and coherent strategies for its 
implementation. An examination of the latest outcomes of the UN summits – the 2030 Agenda. The 2030 
Agenda contains the enormous number of 17 goals and 169 targets.173 This already appears to be more 
decorative than functional.174 Moreover, the 2030 Agenda does not include an overarching goal.175 
Additionally, several goals and the corresponding targets176 are weak or vague.177 Some targets even 
lack the power to enable effective implementation because of their vague formulation.178 Furthermore, 
the environmental dimension of the concept of sustainable development is reflected in the 2030 Agenda 
but not specifically addressed.179 Thirdly, the concept of sustainable development does not characterize 
the environment as an entity with its own rights. Sustainable development rather aims to ensure that the 
development remains within the ecological limits of nature.180 The concept of sustainable development 
places environmental protection within a broader discourse of development and environmental protection 
is only one out of many goals. 
 
In contrast, rights of nature go further than only serving the purpose of sustainable development. Under 
rights of nature natural entities are preserved regardless of their value for humans. This requires that any 
development must respect the “rights” of nature.181 Unlike the concept of sustainable development, the 
main objective of the existing domestic rights of nature is clearly formulated: rights of nature´s purpose is 
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the protection of the environment and the humans who live in it. Hence, the rights of nature approach 
gives environmental protection a much higher priority than the concept of sustainable development does. 
Moreover, the existing domestic rights of nature provisions are defined more precisely than the concept 
of sustainable development. As elaborated above, the existing domestic rights of nature all grant nature 
its own moral and legal claim as well as its own standing. In summary, the nature rights approach is more 
appropriate for achieving environmental protection.182  
 
3.1.1.2 Extension of Legal Protection for Environmental Law 
 
Rights of nature also expand the legal armoury of the existing environmental law. First of all, existing 
domestic rights of nature provisions facilitate the legal protection of the environment since they offer an 
additional legal basis for protecting the environment. Consequently, a claim must not only be based on 
the existing legal instruments. At the same time, rights of nature increase the legal position of nature. In 
most legal systems animals, plants or almost every other part of the planet are legally seen as objects or 
things and are considered property of a natural or a juristic person.183 Any owner enjoys extensive powers 
over his property. For instance, the owner has the right to decide whether or not to kill his animal or to cut 
his tree.184 Moreover, often only the owner has the legal competence to claim compensation for any 
damage of his property. The rights of nature provisions in Ecuador, the US and NZ help to overcome 
these limits of property law. The TUTOHU WHAKATUPA Agreement of New Zealand is an extreme 
example for a completely different approach. As a legal entity, the Whanganui river in New Zealand has 
standing and cannot be owned. The river cannot be owned in any sense that common law property laws 
provide.185 Additionally, the river is able to bring any claim against anyone for damages of its wellbeing.186 
The substantive legal position of nature is, therefore, stronger compared to conventional legal 
approaches. 
 
Rights of nature may also help to overcome the limits of the common law of delict. The common law of 
delict is especially important for the contemporary pollution control law.187 It is an environmental 
compliance and enforcement tool which is generally directed at compensation for patrimonial damage. 
Pursuant to the law of delict a defendant is liable for damage wrongfully caused by an intentional or 
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negligent act against a person or property of another.188 However, it is very difficult to prove all these 
requirements in environmental cases. A plaintiff often does not have sufficient access to scientific 
expertise to prove the requirements.189 The existing domestic rights of nature provisions are much easier 
to comply with than the common law of delict. For a successful damages claim under common law of 
delict or environmental law humans or property must have suffered harm or been damaged by an activity 
which destroys the environment. Rights of nature avoid this problem. They facilitate access to courts 
because the violation of a right of nature is sufficient for a successful claim.190 As seen above, the 
TUTOHU WHAKATUPA Agreement stipulates that the representatives of the Whanganui River can claim 
compensation against anyone for damages of the river irrespective of whether a person or property was 
damaged as a result of the damages done to the river.191 Furthermore, it is significantly less difficult to 
show that the defendant´s action caused harm to the environment than proving that the environmental 
destruction also lead to the plaintiff´s injury.192 This also reduces the costs of legal proceedings. Fewer 
experts and less evidence is required to prove damage to nature than to prove that an action caused 
harm to a human.193  
 
Additionally, the concept of rights of nature also shifts the burden of proof. Environmental litigation and 
the common law of delict regularly face the problem of proving causation. It is often difficult to identify 
who is responsible for environmental destruction.194 In Ecuador, the Provincial Court of Loja stated in the 
Vilcabamba case195 that for an action protecting rights of nature the defendant bears the burden of proving 
that the activity in question does not result in the alleged harm. The Court thereby applied Art. 397(1) of 
Ecuador´s Constitution.196 Art. 397(1) of Ecuador´s Constitutions states “[t]o permit any natural person or 
legal entity, human community or group, to file legal proceedings and resort to judicial and administrative 
bodies without detriment to their direct interest, to obtain from them effective custody in environmental 
matters, including the possibility of requesting precautionary measures that would make it possible to end 
the threat or the environmental damage that is the object of the litigation. The burden of proof regarding 
the absence of potential or real danger shall lie with the operator of the activity or the defendant”. The 
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shift of the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant facilitates environmental litigation 
enormously. It increases the plaintiff´s prospects of success and reduces its costs.  
 
Finally, judges can unilaterally apply rights of nature in their decisions. In Ecuador, different courts applied 
rights of nature even though the lawsuits were originally not concerned with rights of nature. The courts 
recognized rights of nature as part of the Ecuadorian law and their professional standards required them 
to apply and interpret the law in its entirety.197 An example is the Santa Cruz Road case. In 2012, citizens 
filed a lawsuit for protective action to prevent the construction of a road in Santa Cruz, Ecuador. Their 
argument was based on the fact that the municipality did not have an environmental license for the 
project. The court applied rights of nature in its decision even though it was not part of the submission of 
the parties. The judge stated that the case involved the rights of nature and ruled these must be factored 
into any solution.198 Ecuador’s legal system shows, hence, that judges can apply rights of nature even 
when claimants do not base their claims on these. This may also increase the protection of the 
environment. 
 
3.1.2 Promoting a Paradigm Shift 
 
Possibly even more important than the legal benefits of rights of nature is their power to shift paradigms. 
Rights of nature help shift perceptions and the way humans view the world.199 In general, the significance 
of rights is not limited to their legal value. Of a perhaps greater significance is the way in which rights 
influence the moral and political thinking.200 A major benefit of the rights approach is that rights can 
influence political decisions. The implementation of rights of nature increases the weight of nature in 
environmental considerations. Rights have the ability to trump political decisions.201 Consequently, they 
help overcome the lack of political will to protect the environment. Moreover, the recognition that nature 
has its own inherent rights may influence the perception and behaviour towards nature. It offers space 
for a discussion about the environment and conservation that was previously inexistent.202 Important 
examples of a shift of perceptions are the abolition of slavery and the universal recognition of human 
rights.203 The introduction of these rights expended the field of moral concerns. Rights of nature may 
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have a similar effect and lead to a cultural change.204 The idea behind it is that humans abuse nature 
because they regard nature as their commodity.205 Only if humans view nature as a community to which 
they belong will they use nature with respect.206 A shift of perception induced by codified rights of nature 
may, therefore, improve environmental protection by changing the mindset of the people. 
 
3.2 Constraints Facing Existing Domestic Rights of Nature 
 
Despite their benefits, rights of nature face many practical and theoretical problems. This section 
identifies the main procedural and substantive constraints facing the implementation of existing domestic 
rights of nature – again focussing on the constitutional right in Ecuador, rights of nature in ordinances of 
the US and the TUTOHU WHAKATUPA Agreement of New Zealand. A review of relevant literature 
identified three main procedural constraints and three major substantive problem areas. In addition to 
these law related or inherent constraints, on which this dissertation focuses, several non-legal constraints 
exist. Non-legal or contingent constraints, such as economic, historical and social-political factors, may 
also hamper the effective implementation and enforcement of rights of nature.207 Rights of nature only 
contribute to environmental protection if they are enforced by a supportive institutional and political 
environment.208 A lack of government accountability and corruption decreases the efficiency of rights of 
nature.209 Political instability as well as an economy which is based on extraction also have negative 
impacts on the enforcement and implementation of rights of nature.210  
 
3.2.1 Procedural Constraints  
 
There appear to be three main procedural constraints facing the successful implementation of existing 
domestic rights of nature. Firstly, the nature of the institutions with jurisdiction to decide on and enforce 
rights of nature play an important role. Secondly, standing and representation of rights of nature are 
important procedural issues. Thirdly, accountability and costs order provisions in litigation relating to rights 
of nature are key for an effective implementation of rights of nature. 
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3.2.1.1 Institutions, Enforcement & Capacity 
 
An important procedural issue concerns the identification of courts which decide upon rights of nature 
and the authorities which enforce rights of nature. The institutional issue is crucial for two main reasons:  
 
Firstly, lack of judicial independence may prevent any productive environmental litigation.211 Judicial 
independence involves, at its core, the ability and willingness of courts to decide cases in light of the law 
without involvement of other government actors.212 Only if the independence of judges is guaranteed fair 
judgements can be expected. Where the judiciary is ineffective, new developments in substantive law will 
make little difference.213 Different criterions, such as life tenure, limited removal conditions as well as 
secure and good salaries are essential for the independence of judges.214 The same applies to the 
enforcement authorities. Independent public institutions facilitate the implementation and enforcement of 
rights of nature. 
 
Secondly, judges and administrative officers may struggle applying rights of nature because of a lack of 
understanding of these.215 The lack of knowledge regarding rights of nature may lead to incorrect 
interpretation.216 Judges´ knowledge and the right interpretation is particularly important for the 
implementation of rights of nature. A look at court decisions in Ecuador proves this assumption. Many 
lawyers and judges lack knowledge of rights of nature and how to interpret them.217 The idea that rights 
of nature can override property rights in certain circumstances is foreign to many judges and at odds with 
their legal training. Therefore, in some court cases judges in Ecuador have ruled that economic 
development activities are protected by individual rights that supersede rights of nature.218 The case of 
the El Condor-Mirador Mining Project219 in Ecuador, for instance, illustrates the problem of lack of 
knowledge. A collection of indigenous peoples´ movements as well as environmental and human rights 
NGO’s (Non-Governmental Organization´s) filed a case against the Mirador Project and Open Pit Mining 
arguing that the extraction of gold and copper violates rights of nature.220 The Condor-Mirador Mining 
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Project is a large-scale mining project in the Condor Highland. The project includes 6 mining concessions 
in an area of 9,928 hectares.221 The Civil Court of Pichincha dismissed the case. The court based its 
decision on two main considerations. Both reflect a dubious interpretation of constitutional rights of 
nature. Firstly, the judge ruled that since the mining project does not affect a protected area the 
environmental damage does not violate rights of nature.222 This is a very restrictive interpretation and 
implies that only protected areas are subject to rights of nature.223 Ecuador’s Constitution clearly states 
that “nature” has rights and not only nature in protected areas.224 Secondly, the court argued that the civil 
society was protecting private interests (conservation) whereas the mining company was acting on behalf 
of a public interest (development).225 The court further stated that public interest takes precedent over 
private interest. Applied correctly by the courts, Ecuador’s constitutional rights of nature should, however, 
be interpreted independently of social interests and should be of equal value.226  
 
In short, the introduction of rights of nature is like any other ballot initiative or constitutional amendment. 
The role of rights of nature laws will be clarified and defined over time by the courts.227 A lack of knowledge 
and understanding of judges and administrative officers may, therefore, weaken the positive impact rights 
of nature have on environmental protection. 
 
3.2.1.2 Standing and Representation  
 
A major procedural constraint of the existing domestic rights of nature is their standing and representation. 
The fact that nature cannot defend its own interest in a legal system raises the question who should be 
able to give nature a legal voice. Some authors claim that enforceable rights require a human rights-
holder.228 A concept of a right without a rights-holder is seen as a contradiction in terms.229 Some 
commentators even doubt the practical workability of a right held by non-humans.230 However, the recent 
legal recognition accorded to rights of nature show a different reality. As elaborated in Part 2 of the 
dissertation, the existing domestic rights of nature explicitly list different natural entities such as, nature, 
natural communities, ecosystems and rivers as legal persons and give them standing. The existing 
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domestic rights also differ regarding the question who represents these natural entities. Ecuador´s 
Constitution has a wide approach of representation, the ordinances of US municipalities contain a limited 
approach of representation and the TUTOHU WHAKATUPA Agreement follows the guardianship 
approach. Each of the approaches has its limitations.  
 
Rights of nature are only of high value if they are actionable in court. One of the biggest problems of the 
rights of nature in Ecuador´s Constitution is the lack of a clear standing doctrine. Ecuador´s Constitution 
is unclear as to who can bring an action for the protection of nature´s rights before court.231 This causes 
fundamental uncertainty about the justiciability of claims under Art. 71 – Art. 74 of Ecuador’s 
Constitution.232 It gives reason for doubt whether rights of nature actually have the quality of legal 
rights.233 Some authors even interpret the provisions as a list of a national vision rather than a state 
obligation.234 The Constitution remains vague with respect to the requirements for persons defending 
rights of nature.235 Art. 71 of the Constitution stipulates that “every person, people, community or 
nationality, will be able to demand the recognitions of rights for nature before the public organisms”. 
Despite the fact that the Constitution explicitly grants the rights of nature before the courts to any person, 
it remains unclear as to which procedural requirements must be met. Without clear standing criteria 
plaintiffs are not able to effectively sue and rights of nature remain unenforceable.236 The broad “actio 
popularis” (open standing) approach of Ecuador´s Constitution raises further concerns. Actio popularis 
approach means that standing is granted to everyone, regardless of whether they suffered direct harm.237 
Permitting anyone to sue on behalf of nature bares several risks. An insufficiently prepared 
representative, for instance, may litigate a case which creates bad precedent.238 Actio popularis could 
also lead to a “race to the court” by different parties.239 A “race to the court” by different parties wastes 
resources and does not further rights of nature. 
 
In contrast, the approach of most of the US ordinances seems too narrow. Many ordinances limit the 
number of representatives to the residents of the city or the borough.240 This approach limits the 
effectiveness of rights of nature because they may not be claimed by anybody. Many residents may not 
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be interested or do not have the knowledge and financial background to defend nature´s rights. As a 
result, no one may claim rights of nature in the end. 
 
The guardianship approach of the TUTOHU WHAKATUPA Agreement also has disadvantages. Pursuant 
to the agreement the government is one out of two representatives of the river. This representation may 
not serve to protect the major value of the environment. Governments´ short term interests conflict with 
long term ecological interests.241 Governmental authorities normally issue exploration and exploitation 
permits and generate considerable revenues with those licenses for the state. Moreover, a certain level 
of degradation may also be justified for most of the human population.242 Therefore, the government may 
not always act on behalf of the interests of the natural entity. This critique not only applies to a 
government. Each guardian may have its own interest which collide with natures interests.  
 
The question whether natural entities are capable of having interests and whether humans can determine 
these interests does not only apply to the guardianship approach.243 Each approach of representation 
must deal with this problem. As soon as people are able to sue on behalf of nature under a standing 
doctrine, there is the possibility that claims based on nature´s rights will be used to further personal 
interest.244 An example is the previously mentioned Vilcabamba River case245 in Ecuador. The plaintiffs 
argued on behalf of nature that the construction of a road was polluting the Vilcabamba River. Even 
though the positive judgement prevented environmental damage, it was primarily a victory for the plaintiffs 
and their economic interests. Their property would have been flooded by the construction of the road. 
The plaintiffs had plans to construct tourist facilities on their property. These may have similar impacts on 
the environment as the construction of the road would have had.246 Another aspect of the problem is that 
more powerful groups, such as well-resourced communities and corporations, could use rights of nature 
to perpetuate their personal objectives. Schools or waste treatment facilities, for instance, are necessary 
but also create strains for residents. Powerful groups may use rights of nature to relocate such 
developments to neighbourhoods which have less resources to fight them. Consequently, poor 
neighbourhoods are probably more affected by developments and the impacts on the environment could 
be even greater.247 Therefore, problematically formulated standing doctrines may not only harm the 
environment but also cause environmental injustice. In short, standing and representation of rights of 
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nature are difficult to regulate. The approaches in Ecuador´s Constitution, ordinances in the US and 
TUTOHU WHAKATUPA Agreement all have flaws. Hence, a different approach to standing and 
representation is necessary. 
 
3.2.1.3 Accountability and Costs 
 
Two further important procedural constraints facing existing domestic rights of nature are the 
accountability and the costs of proceedings.248  
 
Firstly, it should be clear who can be held accountable for violations of rights of nature. The most 
significant environmental damages result from multiple actions which take place simultaneously. Often 
public as well as private actions are responsible for environmental damage.249 The existing domestic 
rights of nature do not contain clear accountability provisions. They do not clearly stipulate whether the 
state and its organs and/or private entities are to be held liable. Moreover, violations of rights of nature 
often exhibit transnational dimensions.250 The existing domestic rights of nature do not lay down any 
provisions on how to deal with environmental damage in a transnational context. 
 
Secondly, it is imperative to determine the costs for the legal representation and court fees.251 
Proceedings can be extremely expensive. Environmental litigation can be far more costly than the 
vindication of other rights.252 Only if the legal costs are affordable and clearly determined prior to the 
proceedings will plaintiffs bring legal action to protect the environment. At the same time, the legal 
expenses should not be too low. Otherwise, there are no boundaries to file a claim and rights of nature 
are used inflationary. This may threaten the capacities of legal systems.  
 
3.2.2 Substantive Constraints  
 
Existing domestic rights of nature also face three main substantive constraints. These constraints 
especially relate to their scope. Firstly, the scope of existing domestic rights of nature itself raises 
concerns. Secondly, the definition of an actionable violation of rights of nature is complicated. Thirdly, the 
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relation of rights of nature to other rights and the relation of rights of nature amongst each other is 
challenging.  
 
3.2.2.1 Scope of Rights  
 
The scope of each of the existing domestic rights of nature is defined differently and each of the existing 
domestic rights of nature provisions faces different challenges regarding their scope.  
 
Ecuador’s Constitution has an extensive approach and states that “Nature or Pachamama, where life is 
reproduced and exists, has the right to exist, persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, 
functions and its processes in evolution”.253 Defining rights in such wide terms raises various concerns. 
First of all, the constitutional provisions of rights of nature in Ecuador’s Constitution are textually vague.254 
Some commentators are of the opinion that it is not clear whether the provisions provide a basis for a 
legal cause of action or if they are intended to be broad statements of policy.255 One could even argue 
that rights of nature seek to turn the world back to a wild forests.256 Moreover, the provisions do not define 
the entities they seek to protect.257 The main problem is that the Constitution does not determine the term 
“nature” or “Pachamama”.258 Both concepts are extremely broad and are likely to confuse courts and 
litigants.259 It can be claimed that the use of general language is part of constitutional provisions and 
allows a broad interpretation and relevance over time.260 However, the broad interpretation may lead to 
conflicts. Nature could reasonably include a wide range of entities.261 From a scientific perspective nature 
also contains less endearing entities such as pest, viruses, bacteria, tornados and intangible entities like 
climate.262 Ecuador’s Constitution, read literally, grants all these entities equal rights “to exist, persist, 
maintain and regenerate”263 as well as restore themselves.264 Therefore, by granting broad protection, 
Ecuador’s Constitution creates bizarre conflicts between different entities. A litigant could, for instance, 
prepare a case on behalf of viruses.265 Furthermore, the broad term nature leaves its interpretation to 
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judges. This poses a difficulty. Judges could adapt an anthropocentric definition of nature and 
corporations may justify the destruction of nature with the protections of other rights of nature.266  
 
The determination of the US ordinances that “natural communities and ecosystems […] possess […] 
rights to exist and flourish”267 raises similar concerns as the broad scope of rights of nature in Ecuador’s 
Constitution. Since the ordinances only specify and not limit the terms “natural communities and 
ecosystems” they also have a broad scope. Therefore, rights of nature provisions in US ordinances may 
also include entities such as pest and give the opportunity to interpret them in anthropocentric way. 
However, the ordinances of the US specify their scope by focussing on certain topics. The ordinance of 
the City of Pittsburgh, for instance, protects particularly “wetlands, streams, rivers, aquifers, and other 
water systems”.268 This makes it easier to apply and to enforce the US ordinances than the broader 
provisions in Ecuador´s Constitution.269 For instance, a litigant in the City of Pittsburgh can be assured 
that different kinds of water systems are protected by the ordinance. 
 
For a litigant on behalf of the the Whanganui River it is even more obvious. The TUTOHU WHAKATUPA 
Agreement clearly stipulates that only the Whanganui River is protected and grants rights only to the 
river.270 Since the TUTOHU WHAKATUPA Agreement recognises a particular natural entity as rights 
holder rights of nature are easily applicable. 
 
Another issue all existing domestic rights of nature face is the question of the extent of protection.271 
Ecuador´s Constitution grants nature “the right to exist, persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, 
structure, functions and its processes in evolution”.272 The US ordinances state that “natural communities 
and ecosystems […] possess […] rights to exist and flourish”. In contrast, the TUTOHU WHAKATUPA 
Agreement does not clearly name the rights of the Whanganui River. The TUTOHU WHAKATUPA 
Agreement only lays down the primary functions of guardians. A primary function of the guardians is, for 
instance, the protection of the health and wellbeing of the river.273 But what exactly does it mean that 
nature has the right to maintain or to exist and what is part of the health and wellbeing of the Whanganui 
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River? Since the existing domestic rights of nature do not define the extent of protection judges must 
interpret and thereby define the provisions.  
 
In short, rights of nature should be defined clearly regarding the entities they protect and regarding the 
extent of protection. Without a clear definition of their scope and extent of protection rights of nature 
cannot achieve their purpose of protecting the environment and environmental plaintiffs face difficulties 
acting on behalf of nature.274 
 
3.2.2.2 Actionable Violations 
 
The experiences with the existing domestic rights of nature also show that courts struggle to define a 
violation of rights of nature.  
 
An expansive interpretation of rights of nature brings considerable juridical challenges. A broad ambit of 
rights of nature may endanger the capacities of legal systems since almost every governmental and 
private action could constitute a violation. However, no government and no legal system can survive if 
every action can be subject to judicial review.275 On the other hand, the scope of rights of nature must 
not be too narrow. If the ambit is too narrow rights of nature do not provide sufficient protection for the 
environment. Furthermore, vindicating environmental rights often leads to fundamental questions of 
policy choices.276 This means that courts must balance various interests. For instance, should a court call 
for the closure of an industrial site to protect the environment even though that results in loss of jobs and 
poverty for the employees while the environmental damage is low? Or should a court restrict hydraulic 
fracturing on behalf of the environment even if the exploitation of gas advances the nation´s energy 
independence and the risks of environmental damages are limited?277 Therefore, it is essential to define 
the thresholds which constitute an actionable violation of rights of nature.  
 
3.2.2.3 Relationship with Other Rights 
 
Another problem of the existing domestic rights of nature is the relation of the respective right to other 
rights as well as the relation of rights of nature amongst each other.  
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Seeing nature and humans as equivalent entities in law can be problematic.278 Ecuador’s Constitution, 
the ordinances of the US and the TUTOHU WHAKATUPA Agreement do not provide any guidance as to 
what happens when rights of nature conflict with human rights. What happens if the human right of 
property collides with the right of an animal to exist? Or what happens if the Whanganui River is 
threatening to flood a settlement and this can only be prevented by building a dam? This lack of clarity 
regarding the hierarchy of rights prevents an effective application of rights of nature.279 
 
Additionally, neither Ecuador´s Constitution nor the ordinances of the US provide instructions on how to 
balance different rights of nature against each other. For instance, the concept of nature in Ecuador’s 
Constitution is very broad which leads to bizarre conflicts between different entities. The same applies to 
natural communities and ecosystems which are protected by US ordinances. There is no way to mediate 
between competing claims within the concept of nature.280 For instance, how should judges weigh the 
loss of wetland habitat with the potential for the restoration of fish habitat in a dam removal project?281  
 
3.3 Summary of Key Lessons 
 
Rights of nature may further the environmental protection significantly. This assumption is based on two 
main reasons: Existing domestic rights of nature add important legal aspects and promote a paradigm 
shift of the way humans morally and politically perceive the environment. The existing domestic rights of 
nature provisions stipulate a much higher standard of protection than other environmental movements. 
They give environmental protection a higher priority than the predominant concept of sustainable 
development does by preserving natural entities regardless of their value for humans. Additionally, they 
expand the legal armoury by overcoming the limits of present environmental law. The existing domestic 
rights of nature are easier to apply compared to other environmental laws. They facilitate the protection 
of natural entities because they overcome the difficulties to prove the requirements of environmental laws 
such as the common law of delict.  
 
However, many inherent constraints prevent an effective application of the existing domestic rights of 
nature. There are three main procedural constraints of concern. Firstly, judicial and administrative 
institutions which are not independent and poorly trained obstruct the implementation and enforcement 
of rights of nature. Secondly, a lack of a clear and coherent standing doctrine hinders the effectiveness 
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of rights of nature and may even promote environmental injustice. Thirdly, accountability and the costs of 
legal proceedings also strongly influence the efficiency of rights of nature.  
 
Additionally, the existing domestic rights of nature face three major substantive constraints. To begin with, 
the scope of the existing domestic rights of nature raises concerns. In particular, their scope is not defined 
clearly regarding the entities they protect and the extent of protection. Without a clear definition of the 
scope rights of nature cannot achieve their purpose of protecting the environment. Furthermore, the 
existing domestic rights of nature fail to define thresholds for an actionable violation of rights of nature. 
Only if thresholds are determined can rights of nature be applied effectively. Finally, the existing domestic 
rights of nature provisions lack guidance as to how to handle a conflict between rights of nature and 







4. Towards a Workable Domestic Rights of Nature Provision 
 
As elaborated in Part 3, many inherent constraints prevent an effective application of the existing 
domestic rights of nature. Therefore, Part 4 elaborates specific proposals for a more workable domestic 
rights of nature provision. Firstly, section 4.1 shows that rights of nature should be implemented as a 
constitutional right. Secondly, section 4.2 considers general requirements relevant for a constitutional 
rights of nature provision. Finally, section 4.3 examines how to overcome the main procedural and 
substantive constraints of the existing domestic rights of nature. It will be demonstrated that future 
attempts to codify rights of nature can draw on lessons learnt from the existing codifications. Future rights 
of nature should adapt their wording and their framing to the success and failures of the existing domestic 
rights of nature.282  
 
4.1 Why Entrench Rights of Nature in a Constitution 
 
For the implementation of rights of nature, it is crucial to examine where rights of nature should be 
embedded in the legal system. As illustrated above, rights of nature are implemented in different ways. 
Rights of nature exist as a declaration on the international level, as a provision on the constitutional level 
in Ecuador, on the local level in ordinances of US municipalities and in form of an agreement in NZ. 
However, other ways of implementation are possible. Rights of nature can also be introduced into the 
preamble of environmental legislation, in a statement of government policy or through the establishment 
of a parliamentary committee on nature rights.283 However, the aim of the following analysis is to show 
that rights of nature should ideally be embedded as a hard domestic legal instrument, preferably a 
country´s constitution in order to be most effective. 
 
4.1.1 Hard Law vs Soft Law Legal Instruments 
 
As a first step, it is important to determine why rights of nature should be implemented as a hard law legal 
instrument instead of a soft law legal instrument. One way of advancing rights of nature is through the 
recognition of rights of nature. This non-binding soft law introduction of rights of nature can be termed the 
“recognition route”.284 The “recognition route” is based on the idea that there is an acknowledgement but 
not necessarily any legislation or institutional enforcement of rights of nature.285  
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The UDRME286 (Universal Declaration of Rights of Mother Earth) is probably the most important example 
of the “recognition route”. In 2010, the UDRME was proclaimed at the World´s People´s Conference on 
Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth in Cochabamba, Bolivia.287 Just like the UDHR (Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights) aims at protecting humans, the UDRME seeks to protect the Earth from 
excess of humans and human governance systems.288 The UNDRME is not yet recognised in formal 
international law. It was drafted by private people and organisations. The declaration was, however, 
formally considered at the April 2011 UN Dialogue on Harmony with Nature.289 The UDRME contains a 
preamble and four Articles. The declaration recognizes that Earth is “an indivisible, living community of 
interrelated and interdependent beings with a common destiny”.290 It grants “Earth and all beings of which 
she is composed […] inherent rights”.291 Furthermore, the declaration defines fundamental human 
obligations towards other beings and to the Earth.292 Even though the UDRME is not legally binding it 
can have a similar effect as the UDHR. As a non-legal binding document, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights has changed governance systems all around the world.293 The UDRME gives guidance 
for rights of nature around the world and can serve as a model for national lawmakers. This may develop 
further the implementation of rights of nature and may be an important first step to recognize the needs 
and rights of nature.294 
 
The same also applies to the Tribunal (International Tribunal for the Rights of Nature and Mother Earth). 
The Tribunal sat for the first time in January 2010 in Ecuador. It was created by an international civil 
network and compromised of lawyers and ethical leaders from indigenous and non-indigenous 
communities around the world.295 The Tribunal hears cases regarding alleged violations of rights of nature 
and recommends appropriate remedies and restoration. Thereby, the main legal source is the UDRME.296 
The Tribunal is an important forum for two main reasons. It draws the attention of an international 
audience to environmental destruction. It is also important for reclaiming “justice” for state sanctioned 
violations of rights of nature.297 
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The “recognition route” is valuable for the promotion of rights of nature as the UDRME and the Tribunal 
will hopefully have a positive effect on people´s thinking. However, the “recognition route” has major 
disadvantages. Firstly, as elaborated above, the current state of the environment is alarming. It is 
essential that rights of nature are implemented soon. A look at the UDHR shows that the declaration was 
very important for the development of human rights around the world. However, the implementation of 
human rights in national legislation took decades and is in parts still not implemented. The same may 
apply for rights of nature in the UDRME. The environment cannot wait several decades. Fast changes 
are necessary. Secondly, the UDRME and the decisions of the Tribunal are not binding. Neither the 
declaration nor the activities of the Tribunal are enforceable.298 Therefore, they do not have the impact 
legally implemented rights of nature do have. Legally implemented rights of nature are binding and 
enforceable. Thus, whilst the “recognition route” is important for the further development of rights of 
nature and crucial as a guidance, it can only serve as an additional measure. It cannot substitute 
implementation of rights of nature as a hard law legal instrument. Hence, a hard law legal instrument is 
preferable compared to a soft law legal instrument.  
 
4.1.2 International vs Domestic Sphere 
 
As a second step, it is important to examine whether rights of nature should be implemented on a 
domestic level rather than on an international level. Domestic implementation of rights of nature would 
appear to provide many advantages when compared to international implementation. Compliance and 
enforcement, the lack of a central legislative authority, long procedures, weak environmental obligations 
and the absence of a hierarchical jurisdiction are major disadvantages of the implementation of rights of 
nature in the international context - disadvantages which do not similarly appear to exist in the domestic 
context. 
 
Firstly, poor compliance and weak enforcement tools of international environmental law are a major 
reason why rights of nature should be implemented on the domestic level. Ensuring compliance by 
members of the international community with international environmental obligations continues to prove 
difficult.299 The international arrangements for compliance with international obligations are not sufficient 
to overcome political, economic and social reasons for non-compliance.300 Moreover, international law 
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does not have sufficient enforcement tools. Especially since the extent of sanctions is limited states do 
not always comply with international law.301 Only a small number of environmental agreements have 
established international institutions that can directly impose sanctions or have authorized its members 
to impose trade sanctions against violating parties.302 It is mainly in the hands of states to enforce 
environmental obligations. Unfortunately, states have often been unwilling to bring international claims to 
enforce environmental rights and obligations.303  
 
Secondly, the lack of a central legislative authority in international environmental law hinders effective 
codification.304 An international legislature as such does not exist. Much of international environmental 
law is the product of a legislative process which involves several actors and procedures, such as 
international organizations and states, conference diplomacy, international courts as well as an interplay 
of treaties, non-binding declarations and customary law.305 In general, the international law-making 
system is far less developed than the national system.306 It is therefore difficult to react instantly to new 
environmental challenges. Furthermore, international environmental laws are often the result of 
substantial compromise and lengthy negotiations as they are built on consensus.307 Consensus among 
the international actors is a critical determent of international law.308 Binding international law is only 
constituted if the international actors, particularly the states, intend to create a legally binding 
instrument.309 Since the interests of the actors differ in many aspects not many enforceable environmental 
law instruments exist in the international context. Much of the international environmental law is soft law 
and its value is merely of a moral and political nature.310 Moreover, states are often reluctant to surrender 
control over their territory, peoples and affairs to external international authorities. Even once states have 
ratified an international agreement, they regularly add reservations to preserve their right to decline to be 
bound by particular parts of the agreement. This weakens the effectiveness of international law.311 
 
Thirdly, international law does not know an independent judiciary body with powers comparable to these 
of domestic jurisdictions. Even though the role of independent and international jurisdictions is growing, 
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scope and content of international environmental disputes are of the choice of the states.312 Additionally, 
even when international courts have jurisdiction over an international dispute, they heavily rely on the 
cooperation of states to enforce their decisions.313 
 
In contrast to international law, domestic law is, at least in most of the countries that follow the rule of law, 
made by a parliament or legislative body. The law of the central legislative authority binds even those 
who disagree with it.314 The law is implemented and administered by the executive. Finally, the law is 
interpreted and enforced by an independent judiciary with mandatory jurisdiction and the power to enforce 
its judgements.315 A domestic implementation of rights of nature is therefore more effective and thus 
favourable compared to an international implementation. 
 
4.1.3 Constitution vs other Legal Instruments 
 
Finally, on the domestic level the implementation of rights of nature as a constitutional right is the most 
effective way compared to other ways of implementation, for example (simple) statutory law or as 
ordinances on a local level. Admittedly, specific agreements, such as the TUTOHU WHAKATUPA 
Agreement in NZ, and statutory law, such as ordinances in the US, have several advantages. Specified 
rights which recognise particular natural entities may, for instance, be easier to apply and to enforce than 
a broad constitutional right.316 However, rights of nature as constitutional provisions are the most suitable 
tool to render codified rights of nature effective. This assumption bases on the following: 
 
Rights of nature as a constitutional provision have a number of legal, social and political advantages 
other forms of implementation cannot provide. First of all, the adoption of a constitutional approach 
entrenches a recognition of the importance of environmental protection.317 Legal systems generally 
establish a hierarchy of norms. Constitutional provisions are usually on the highest hierarchy level.318 
Constitutional law normally establishes the ground rules of government, is the supreme law of the land, 
entrenched to reflect and preserve its primacy, and is enforced through the power of judicial review.319 
Therefore, rights of nature being part of a constitution provide the opportunity and the means by which to 
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reform environmental governance and laws.320 Environmental care is prioritized by equating it at the 
higher constitutional level to other fundamental rights. A constitutional codification also creates a 
legitimate foundation to create and enforce rights of nature.321  
 
Secondly, rights of nature as constitutional provisions offer the possibility of unifying principles for 
legislation and regulation.322 A constitution normally sets the basic requirements for state organization.323 
By establishing rights of nature in the constitution they can influence legislation and regulation. Thirdly, 
constitutional provisions normally are the hierarchically superior form of law. They take precedence in 
case of conflict with other norms.324 In other words, rights of nature as constitutional provisions “trump” 
conflicting norms of lower order.325 Fourthly, constitutionally embodied rights of nature are more durable 
than non-entrenched rights.326 In general, constitutional status for rights of nature provides a more stable 
framework for governance. Reason for this is the fact that constitutional provisions are much harder to 
amend. This helps to ensure that rights of nature cannot easily be eroded and that they are not the 
playground of the vicissitudes of day-to-day politics.327  
 
Furthermore, probably due to constitutionalism’s normative superiority, the public is more likely to respond 
to a constitutional provision than to simple statutes. Since constitutionalism bespeaks of shared values 
the likelihood of compliance increases.328 Environmental constitutionalism is also a broad concept. It 
encompasses constitutional law, human rights, environmental law and international law.329 Those rights 
and procedural rights such as rights of access to information and just administrative action are necessary 
for environmental protection. Awarding constitutional protection to rights of nature can lead to a more 
holistic and coalescent approach to environmental protection.330 It may complement already existing 
rights. Finally, many countries´ legislations do not include a broad individual right to a healthy 
environment.331 The implementation of rights of nature in those constitutions can therefore significantly 
improve the legal environmental protection.  
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4.1.4 Summary of Key Lessons 
 
Rights of nature can be most effectively implemented as a constitutional rights clause. A legal 
implementation as a hard law instrument is more practical than the implementation as a soft law 
instrument. A soft law instrument is based on the idea that rights of nature can be promoted through their 
acknowledgement. However, this method takes time and involves non-binding and non-enforceable 
declarations. Domestic implementation also has substantive advantages over an implementation on the 
international level. Compared to international law, domestic law is processed by a central legislative 
authority, it is implemented and administered by the executive as well as interpreted and enforced by an 
independent judiciary with mandatory jurisdiction. Additionally, the implementation of rights of nature as 
a constitutional rights norm has several advantages when compared to other ways of implementation. It 
sets, inter alia, the foundation to create and enforce legally binding rights of nature on a national level, 
trumps rights of lower legal order and is more durable.  
 
4.2 General Considerations Relevant to Constitutional Rights 
 
Rights of nature as a constitutional right should also comply with several general requirements in order 
to be effective. Since 1945 multiple waves of constitutionalization took place around the world which have 
incorporated bills of rights into constitutional law as standard feature.332 These rights usually have the 
characteristics of supremacy, entrenchment and judicial enforceability.333 However, constitutions around 
the world differ in various aspects. There is a wide variability in constitutional structure and traditions, 
judicial systems, acceptance of judicial outcomes, cultural customs as well as the timing of enactment. 
Each of these factors influences judicial outcomes. Due to the wide variability, it is not predictable how 
rights of nature as constitutional rights are judicially receptive.334 In order to be as effective as possible 
rights of nature as a constitutional provision should, however, comply with certain requirements.  
 
Firstly, constitutional provisions can take various forms. These forms are not necessarily substantive or 
self-executing.335 However, in order to be effective a constitutional rights of nature provision should be 
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substantive and self-executing.336 A constitutional right is self-executing if it does not require a separate 
legislative act in order to become effective.337 If provisions are not self-executing, the state and private 
entities are not required to take any particular actions.338 Therefore, rights of nature must be implemented 
as a legal rule and not only as a principle. Unlike a rule, principles are broad requirements. Principles 
require that something must be realized to the greatest extent possible. They are optimization 
requirements and can be satisfied to varying degrees.339 In contrast, rules contain fixed requirements 
which must be fulfilled.340 Rules are norms that require something definitively. They are definitive 
commands which must be complied with.341 An implementation of rights of nature as a self-executing 
legal rule hence offers a broader protection of natural entities than a constitutional principle can. 
 
Secondly, most constitutional rights are designed to benefit people.342 In contrast, rights of nature’s main 
purpose is to protect the environment as a whole. A rights of nature norm in a constitution must therefore 
aim at protecting the environment. The most effective way of protecting the environment is to implement 
rights of nature as a mix of positive and negative claim-rights: The right to non-interference and the right 
to receive compensation as well as to be protected and restored. This combination ensures a wide 
protection of the environment. As seen in Part 2, the existing domestic rights of nature provisions combine 
positive and negative claims. This combination extends the scope of protection significantly in comparison 
to rights which are only positive or negative claim-rights.343 
 
Thirdly, future codifications of rights of nature should create a positive duty for the state to secure 
environmental quality. A constitutional rights of nature provision should force the organs of the state to 
secure rights of nature. Only a positive obligation of the state ensures a further implementation of rights 
of nature. A positive obligation of the state also develops further a constitutional norm to a more 
substantive provision.344 A rights of nature norm in a constitution should therefore state that: “The state 
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has the duty to protect nature, for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable 
legislative and other measures”.345 
 
4.3 Overcoming Procedural and Substantive Constraints  
 
As elaborated in Part 3, several procedural and substantive constraints prevent an effective application 
of the existing domestic rights of nature. Section 4.3.1 thus considers ways to overcome the procedural 
constraints of existing domestic rights of nature while section 4.3.2 considers ways to overcome the 
substantive constraints of existing domestic rights of nature. Each paragraph concludes with a possible 
wording for a constitutional rights of nature norm to overcome the constraint in question. The complete 
draft formulation of a constitutional rights of nature clause is included as Annex 2. 
 
4.3.1 Overcoming Procedural Constraints  
 
The main procedural constraints concern the institutions which decide on and enforce rights of nature, 
standing and representation as well as the accountability and costs of proceedings. This section proposes 
different solutions on how to deal with these procedural constraints. 
 
4.3.1.1 Jurisdiction, Enforcement & Institutions 
 
The lack of knowledge and understanding of rights of nature as well as the absence of independent 
institutions hamper the implementation and enforcement of rights of nature. In particular, the judiciary 
plays an important role in understanding rights of nature.  
 
Therefore, education and empowerment of judges and administrative officers is essential. Only sufficient 
training promotes understanding of rights of nature and a paradigm shift to a more ecocentric 
perspective.346 Moreover, to improve the judiciary and increase judicial independence, judges must enjoy 
special protection. One possibility is granting judges lifetime tenure.347 Judges would be protected from 
executive and legislative impeachment. Lifetime tenure is desirable for judges because it gives them 
economic security and frees them from undesirable pressures, whether from government, politicians or 
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private parties.348 The need for stability and for lifetime tenure is particularly strong in developing countries 
with historically weak judiciaries.349 Other factors to strengthen the position of judges are independent 
selection procedures, limited removal procedures and limited removal conditions as well as salary 
insulations.350  
 
A further option is the implementation of an independent tribunal for rights of nature and special 
authorities to enforce rights of nature. The establishment of both institutions has several advantages. An 
independent enforcement body can provide a special expertise of environmental law and rights of nature. 
An independent body, separate from the government, should also be more objective. Knowledge and 
objectivity will increase the effectiveness of rights of nature.351 An effective enforcement body also gains 
the public´s trust in the government and encourages plaintiffs to bring claims.352 Furthermore, a 
specialized environmental court, staffed with environmental and scientific expertise, promotes fair and 
effective trails. Due to this expertise the courts increase their social legitimacy and are able to issue 
broader and more creative orders to remedy environmental violations.353 Such a tribunal also reduces 
the pressure on other branches of government by deciding politically-charged cases.354 
 
A possible wording for the establishment of the necessary institutions could be: “The state must establish 
an independent tribunal for rights of nature which has exclusive jurisdiction. The judges of the 
independent tribunal for rights of nature are granted lifetime tenure. The state must establish special 
authorities to enforce rights of nature.” 
 
4.3.1.2 Standing and Representation  
 
As elaborated above, different ways of granting standing and representation exist. The existing domestic 
rights of nature differ regarding the question who represents natural entities legally. Each approach of the 
existing domestic rights of nature has its limitations. The most suitable and practical approach to 
overcome the limitations is a mixture of the examined approaches. A limited action popularis approach is 
the most beneficial. 
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First of all, it should be clear that rights of nature only apply in the human interaction with nature and can 
only place duties on human beings. Nature does not hold duties.355 Nature is not capable, as least as far 
as we know, to think and act on behalf of duties or laws. It is important, therefore, that standing and the 
representation is defined clearly. Only a clear standing doctrine ensures that plaintiffs claim rights of 
nature before court.356  
 
Moreover, rights of nature can potentially undermine community and environmental interests. It is 
therefore essential that the representation of nature is limited. Nature´s rights may otherwise be abused 
to pursue economical and other privileged interests.357 The representation of rights of nature should also 
not be too narrow. Only if enough potential plaintiffs have the knowledge and financial background to 
defend the rights of natural entities rights of nature will be effective. A limited actio popularis approach 
may overcome the constrains of a very broad or very narrow standing approach. The limited actio 
popularis approach means that standing is granted to everyone who acts in the best interest of natural 
entities. This approach will guarantee enough potential plaintiffs as well as action in the best interest of 
nature.358 The legal provisions should ensure that plaintiffs truly act in nature´s best interests by making 
action in the best interest of nature a prerequisite for legitimate representation of nature. Best interest 
can be defined as to the best of human capabilities.359 Guidelines for the definition are that the plaintiff 
must have knowledge of the injured community or ecosystem, a genuine interest to protect and is able 
to accurately represent nature in litigation.360 
 
The limited action popularis approach should be codified as follows: “Any person can bring an action to 
defend rights of nature, as long as that person (1) can sufficiently show an actual or imminent injury in 
the natural object, and (2) demonstrate that the potential litigant also has a sufficient interest in the 
outcome”.361 “A sufficient interest means the best interest of nature.” By using this approach 
representation can be limited to natural persons or environmental organisations who have the knowledge 
and resources to litigate.362 This ensures that plaintiffs act on behalf of nature and creates clear standing 
doctrine. 
 
                                                                
355 Burdon 2010 AHR 78. 
356 Rühs & Jones 2016 Sustainability 12. 
357 Fish 2013 SURJ 10. 
358 Laitos “Rules of law for use and nonuse of nature” in Voigt Rule of Law for Nature 220. 
359 Fish 2013 SURJ 10. 
360 Fish 2013 SURJ 10. 
361 Rühs & Jones 2016 Sustainability 12. 





Additionally, rights of nature can be strengthened by using a concept of precautionary standing. The 
concept bases on the “precautionary principle”.363 The precautionary principle applies if there is a threat 
of significant reduction or loss of nature and full scientific certainty is missing. It can be used as a reason 
for initiating measures to avoid or minimize such a threat.364 Courts could apply the principle if plaintiffs 
cannot prove that tangible harm to the environment has already taken place.365 Plaintiffs could, then, sue 
before harm occurs if the constitution grants a concept of precautionary standing.366 
 
4.3.1.3 Accountability and Costs 
 
Finally, it is also important that the accountability is defined clearly and that the costs of legal proceedings 
are neither unaffordable nor very low. 
 
In order to ensure a broad scope of protection, codifications of rights of nature in a constitution should 
include a wide concept of accountability. Private and public entities should be held liable for a violation of 
rights of nature. Rights of nature as a constitutional right must thus apply vertically and horizontally. 
Traditionally, constitutional rights apply only in the public sphere and not in the private sphere i.e. 
vertically.367 In other words, the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of the state are 
directly bound but private actors are not directly addressed by constitutional rights. However, it is 
important that rights of nature are also horizontally applicable. As a consequence, natural and juristic 
persons are also bound by a constitutional rights of nature norm.368 This guarantees that not only the 
state but also private entities are bound by rights of nature and can be held accountable for violations of 
such rights. This is essential because a constitutional rights of nature provision can be violated by both 
private and governmental actors.369 The provision implementing rights of nature should therefore have 
vertical and horizontal effect. 
 
Furthermore, a rights of nature norm should specify affordable costs for legal representation and court 
fees. However, a constitution cannot regulate every detail. The purpose of a constitution is to lay down 
the framework and principal functions of the organs of government within the state and to declare the 
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principles by which those organs operate.370 Details such as costs should thus be regulated in a separate 
act. However, a constitution can determine the implementation and the framework for a fee regulation 
act. Additionally, in order to facilitate access to jurisdiction a legal aid provision should be established. 
Legal aid ensures that people, who are otherwise unable, can afford legal representation and access to 
the court system.371 At the same time, not every case should be supported by legal aid. Only cases with 
reasonable prospects of success should be granted legal aid. Therefore, a legal aid provision is 
necessary which supports people who are economically unable to file a lawsuit and also promotes rights 
of nature. Finally, as seen above, violations of rights of nature also often exhibit transnational dimensions. 
Therefore, a constitution should take the international dimensions of environmental damage into account. 
An option to deal with the problem is to enshrine a duty to cooperate internationally in the constitution. 
 
Concluding, a rights of nature norm in a constitution should contain the following wording: “Rights of 
nature apply to all law, and bind the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state. Rights 
of nature bind natural and juristic persons. The costs for the court and legal representation of rights of 
nature are regulated by a specific act which must guarantee affordable costs. The state has the duty to 
implement the act and to cooperate internationally to promote rights of nature.” 
 
“Any parties who, due to their personal and economic circumstances, are unable to bear the costs of 
litigation of rights of nature, or are able to bear them only in part or only as instalments, will be granted 
assistance. The granting of legal aid by the court requires that the applicant proves that the claimant is 
(1) economically not able to bear the costs of the procedures, and (2) that his lawsuit has reasonable 
prospects of success, and (3) that the cause of action is not frivolous”.372 
 
4.3.2 Overcoming Substantive Constraints  
 
Beside the procedural constraints, several substantive constraints hinder the effective application of rights 
of nature. The main substantive constraints concern the scope of rights of nature, the definition of an 
actionable violation of rights of nature as well as the relation of rights of nature to other rights and the 
relation of rights of nature amongst each other. This section proposes solutions on how to deal with these 
constraints. 
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4.3.2.1 Scope of Rights 
 
In order to be effective rights of nature should have a broad scope regarding the entities they protect and 
the extent of protection. A wide scope is necessary to ensure a broad protection of nature and the 
environment. As elaborated above, the scope of the existing domestic rights of nature is defined 
differently. To guarantee a broad scope future codifications should draw their wording from Ecuador´s 
Constitution and include the widest possible term: “nature”. However, the term “nature” should be defined 
as precisely as possible. Reason for this is the fact that courts must develop or interpret concepts and 
vocabulary of new constitutional terms which are often vague and amorphous.373 The main problems with 
constitutional environmental rights relate to their vagueness and lack of statutory guidance.374 If nature 
is not defined precisely enough judges could adapt an anthropocentric definition of nature and rights of 
nature would not be able to serve their purpose of protecting the environment. 
 
However, it is difficult to define nature precisely. First of all, it is important that the term nature is widely 
applicable. Only if nature in a general sense is encompassed a broad protection can be achieved. The 
term nature should include a wide range of components. An effective option of interpreting the term is the 
ecological holism approach. The ecological holism concept assumes that all components of a natural 
system, living or non-living, are important. It also presumes that the relevant natural entity is the 
interrelationship that emerges between nature’s parts when humans do not interfere.375 The concept of 
ecological holism captures the entire network of interrelations that exist between entities in the nature. 
This includes living entities, such as animals, as well as non-living entities, such as the atmosphere and 
the waters of the oceans.376  
 
A broad interpretation of nature, however, also faces challenges. As elaborated above, a broad 
interpretation may lead to conflicts and confusion. Nature can theoretically include almost everything and 
may confuse courts and litigants. Therefore, it is essential to limit the scope of rights of nature. The 
limitation of the scope should be done in two steps. Firstly, the content should be limited to a core. 
Secondly, each natural entity should have its own core rights. Therefore, a process is necessary which 
defines these core rights for each natural entity in detail. A constitution should initiate this process.  
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A practical way of limiting the content of rights of nature is looking at the implemented rights of nature or 
the principles of Earth Jurisprudence. According to the principles of Earth Jurisprudence “[t]he Earth 
community and all the beings that constitute it have fundamental “rights,” including the right to exist, to 
have a habitat or a place to be, and to participate in the evolution of the community”. 377 This approach is 
similar to the concept of a “minimum core content”. This concept involves the identification of the core 
elements of a right which must be respected.378 By limiting the scope of rights of nature to the right to 
exist, to have a habitat or a place to be and to participate in the evolution more clarity can be achieved.  
 
In a second step, rights of nature should be defined more precisely for each entity. Without subsequent 
attempts to clarify, the rights of nature content is open to various court interpretations.379 Therefore, each 
entity should have its specific rights. Berry explained: “Rivers have river rights. Birds have bird rights. 
Insects have insect rights. Humans have human rights. Difference in rights is qualitative, not quantitative. 
The right of an insect would be of no value to a tree or fish”.380 The UDRME further states that “just as 
human beings have human rights, all other beings also have rights which are specific to their species or 
kind and appropriate for their role and function within the communities within which they exist”.381 In other 
words, each element of nature should have subject-specific rights to fulfil its roles and evolutionary 
process.382 For instance, waterways have waterway rights. This includes the right to flow with water in an 
amount and quality necessary for the waterway and its dependent ecosystems and species to exist, thrive 
and evolve.383 If rights of nature are specified for different entities it will be much easier for courts and 
litigants to apply them. A constitution cannot, however, specify the core rights of each entity. A constitution 
can only promote the process and set the framework for a specification. The constitution can determine 
the process and order the legislative to further legislation protecting each rights-bearing entity. The exact 
scope of each right of nature will have to be negotiated in a political process.384 This could have benefits 
as a political process can include public participation. Public participation may develop further the value 
of rights nature because it raises awareness.  
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To conclude, a constitution should define nature in a broad way in order to protect it effectively. However, 
in order to be practical, the content of rights of nature should also be limited. Moreover, the constitution 
must initiate a process to specify the rights of each rights-bearing entity.  
 
Taking this into account a wording for rights of nature could be the following: “Nature has fundamental 
rights, including the right to exist, to have a habitat or a place to be, and to participate in the evolution of 
the community. Nature has the right to be restored. Nature contains all components of the natural system, 
including living and non-living entities. Each entity has its specific rights. The state has the duty to 
implement further legislation protecting each rights-bearing entity.” 
 
4.3.2.2 Actionable Violations 
 
A related important issue is the expansive application of rights of nature. As seen above, a broad scope 
of rights of nature may endanger the capacities of legal systems. In order to further limit an expansive 
interpretation this paragraph determines thresholds which could serve as indicators for a violation of rights 
of nature.  
 
A practical way to simultaneously limit the scope of rights of nature and promote a broad protection is to 
implement a minimum threshold in the legislation. This may avoid that every restriction of rights of nature 
is considered a violation of the right. A violation of rights of nature should only be assumed if a specific 
threshold is crossed. Science should play a key role in the development of these thresholds. Scientific 
criteria are, in general, important for environmental norms and rules.385 Accurately scientific criteria help 
to impose legal obligations corresponding to a constitutional rights of nature provision.386 Therefore, the 
application of scientific criteria can serve to develop thresholds. However, as already seen above, a 
constitution cannot set specific thresholds. It can only set the framework for the development of 
thresholds. Therefore, a constitutional rights of nature norm should obligate the state to develop and 
adjust binding scientific guidelines for specific thresholds. The guidelines should lay down when the 
threshold defining a violation of the right of nature to exist, to have a habitat or a place to be, and to 
participate in the evolution of the community is crossed. Moreover, guidelines for each entity must be 
developed. Since each entity, such as birds, rivers or insects, should have its specific right each right 
needs its specific threshold. However, the constitutional norm must also ensure that the guidelines do not 
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undermine the purpose of the rights of nature by setting the threshold to high. Finally, the constitution 
should set timelines for the development and implementation of the guidelines in order to accelerate 
proceedings. 
 
A possible wording for the implementation of thresholds could be: “Not every restriction of a right of nature 
is a violation of the right. Only if a minimum threshold is crossed a violation of rights of nature is given. 
The state has the duty to develop and adjust regularly binding scientific guidelines for specific thresholds 
for each entity. The state must implement the guidelines two years after this norm becomes effective. The 
guidelines have to be developed to ensure the protection of the environment.” 
 
4.3.2.3 Relationship with Other Rights 
 
The existing domestic rights of nature also ignore the potential for conflicting interests between different 
rights.387 As seen above, it is essential that the relation of the rights to other constitutional rights as well 
as the relation of rights of nature amongst each other is clearly defined. This paragraph examines a 
preferable hierarchy of rights of nature. 
 
In general, rights of nature should not be implemented as “absolute rights”.388 An absolute right is one 
that is never justifiably infringed. Absolute rights must be respected in all possible circumstances.389 
Rights of nature as absolute rights are probably politically unacceptable. It is hard to imagine that the 
legislative organs in different countries will vote for an absolute right. Additionally, rights are rarely 
recognized as absolute by courts around the world.390 Moreover, the implementation of rights of nature 
as absolute rights would be contradictive to their theoretical background. Rights of nature promote that 
nature and humans are seen as equally important. This bases on the idea that all things are 
interconnected and that humans do not stand above of the system earth but are part of it.391 
Consequently, this means that nature is just as important as humans. Rights of nature should, therefore, 
rather be established as “prima facie” rights. These rights can be justifiably overridden in certain 
circumstances. In other words, rights of nature may have to yield to competing and more weighty 
considerations in certain circumstances.392 
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However, in order to be effective, rights of nature must possess sufficient legal clout to override purely 
utilitarian considerations of other rights.393 A way to achieve a balance between different rights is to focus 
on relationships rather than individual rights. To resolve a dispute between conflicting rights the solution 
should focus on relationships. As a consequence, social and environmental contexts become relevant 
which may lead to better outcomes.394 A practical option to regulate the relation of rights of nature and 
other rights is through the guidance of the UDRME.395 The UDRME stipulates that “the rights of each 
being are limited by the rights of other beings and any conflict between their rights must be resolved in a 
way that maintains the integrity, balance and health of Mother Earth”396. In other words, each right is 
limited by other rights and can be trumped only for specific reasons. The formulation is general and 
includes human and non-human rights. It guarantees the protection of the environment and offers a 
mechanism to further limit the wide scope of the term nature. Rights of entities, such as pest, viruses, 
bacteria and tornados, can be trumped by other rights, such as the rights of a mountain or human rights.  
 
A further means to find an adequate balance between rights of nature and other constitutional rights as 
well as between the individual rights of nature can be taken from the “principle of practical 
concordance”397 and the “principle of proportionality”398. The principle of practical concordance can be 
helpful for courts to balance different constitutional rights. The principle is used to solve conflicting 
rules.399 It stipulates, in case of conflict, that constitutionally protected legal values must be harmonized 
with one another in such a way that each right is restricted as little as possible.400 Part of the principle of 
practical concordance is a proportionality analysis. Proportionality is recognized as a general principle of 
law by constitutional courts and international tribunals in many countries.401 Even though there are 
differences in applications among courts the basic idea is that larger harms should be justified by more 
weighty reasons and that more severe violations of the law should be more harshly sanctioned than less 
severe ones.402  
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A wording regarding the hierarchy of rights could, hence, be the following: “Rights of nature are limited 
by the rights of other beings and any conflict between their rights must be resolved in a way that maintains 
the integrity, balance and health of the environment. Courts should use the principle of practical 








Rights of nature further the environmental protection significantly and can serve to reduce the 
environmental destruction caused by humans. Existing domestic rights of nature guarantee a much 
higher standard of protection than former environmental movements. They expand the legal armoury of 
present environmental law and promote a paradigm shift of the way humans perceive the environment. 
The examination of the existing domestic rights of nature shows that these have many things in common, 
but there are also some significant differences. Existing domestic rights of nature are based on similar 
foundations and seek to protect the environment from detrimental economic interests and bad 
governance. They acknowledge that natural entities possess inalienable rights and have standing to 
initiate legal procedures in their own name and for their own benefits. Their legal construction includes 
positive and negative claim-rights in order to ensure a positive duty for compensation and a negative duty 
of non-interference. At the same time, the existing domestic rights of nature also differ in various aspects. 
They are implemented differently – in a constitution, in ordinances as well as in an agreement - and do 
not have the same scope or approach to representation.  
 
Several procedural and substantive constrains prevent an effective application of the existing domestic 
rights of nature. Three main procedural constraints raise concerns. Firstly, non-independent and poorly 
trained judicial and administrative institutions hamper an effective implementation and enforcement. 
Secondly, the respective standing doctrine of the existing domestic rights of nature obstructs a more 
active application of the rights. Thirdly, the accountability and legal cost provisions of the existing domestic 
rights of nature must be improved. Additionally, existing domestic rights of nature face three major 
substantive constraints. First of all, their scope must be regulated more precisely regarding the entities 
they protect as well as the extent of protection. Also, existing domestic rights of nature do not define 
thresholds above which an infringement is considered an actionable violation. Finally, existing domestic 
rights of nature lack clear guidance on how to balance rights of nature with human rights and with other 
rights of nature. 
 
In order to design rights of nature which can be implemented and applied effectively, the lessons learned 
from the analysis of the existing domestic rights of nature can be drawn upon. Wording and framing of 
the codification should be adapted according to the success and failures of the implemented rights. 
Several ways exist to overcome the procedural and substantive constraints of the existing domestic rights 
of nature which this dissertation presents. The outlined solutions lay the bases for the proposal of 





specific wording of a rights of nature clause (Annex 2). The wording of the draft of a constitutional rights 
of nature clause is based on the considerations of this dissertation and is meant to serve as an example 
for an ideal rights of nature norm. The guidelines for the effective domestic implementation of rights of 
nature summarize the most important requirements for the implementation of a rights of nature norm. 
The guidelines can be used as a brief instruction by legislators. 
 
A workable domestic rights of nature provision should be embedded as a hard domestic legal instrument 
in a country´s constitution. A constitutional implementation ensures direct application of rights of nature, 
implementation and enforcement by national institutions, supremacy over rights of lower legal order and 
a high degree of durability. In order to be effective, it is also essential that a constitutional right complies 
with certain general requirements. Firstly, a constitutional provision should be self-executing so that rights 
of nature are directly enforceable. Secondly, a rights of nature provision should be conceived as a mix of 
positive and negative claim-rights in order to ensure a wide protection of the environment. Finally, a 
constitutional codification of rights of nature should obligate the state to further secure rights of nature. 
Only such an obligation of the state will guarantee a further implementation of rights of nature.  
 
To resolve the procedural constraints the following recommendations should be followed: Firstly, an 
independent tribunal for rights of nature and special authorities to enforce rights of nature should be 
established. Secondly, a limited actio popularis approach should be sought as it is the best way to regulate 
standing and representation. A limited actio popularis approach guarantees enough potential plaintiffs 
who act in the best interest of nature and not only for their benefits. Thirdly, rights of nature should include 
a broad concept of accountability which holds both private and public entities liable. A rights of nature 
norm should also determine affordable costs for legal representation and provide legal aid provision. 
 
To overcome the substantive constraints of the existing domestic rights of nature a rights of nature norm 
should contain several components. Firstly, rights of nature should have a broad scope and contain a 
definition of nature which includes all living and non-living entities. Only a wide scope guarantees an 
adequate protection of the environment. However, in order to be practical, the scope of rights of nature 
should also be limited to a minimum core content. Each entity should be attributed its own core rights. 
Furthermore, to prevent an excessive application codified rights of nature should include a minimum 
threshold for a violation of a right of nature. Only if the threshold is crossed can a violation of the rights 
be assumed and damages claimed. Finally, conflicts between rights must be resolved in a way that 






However, it is important to note that rights of nature also face non-legal or contingent constraints such as 
economic, historical and social-political factors which may prevent the effective implementation and 
enforcement of rights of nature. Only if the governments around the world rethink and change their 
attitude and behaviour towards nature can an environmental catastrophe with devastating impacts for the 
human population be avoided. It is high time to overcome the anthropocentric world view and to begin 
valuing nature. An effective domestic rights of nature clause in every constitution is an important step to 
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Annex 1 – Guidelines for the Effective Domestic Implementation of Rights of Nature 
 
The main requirements for the effective domestic implementation of rights of nature are the following: 
 
A rights of nature norm 
 
1. should be implemented as a self-executing constitutional right  
2. should be implemented as a mix of positive and negative claim-rights 
3. should have a broad scope – “nature” in a broad sense 
4. should define the term “nature” 
5. should state that legislation, jurisdiction and executive must take rights of nature into account 
and that natural and juristic persons are bound by them 
6. should state how rights of nature must be balanced with other rights and how rights of nature 
should be balanced amongst each other: prima facie right and not an absolute right 
7. should implement minimum thresholds to limit the scope of rights of nature 
8. should provide clear guidelines for further implementation: obligate the legislator to specify rights 
of nature; i.e. rights for different species and habitats and set timelines for the further 
implementation 
9. should regulate the standing: a limited actio popularis approach 
10. should establish a separate tribunal only for issues regarding rights of nature 
11. should appoint a special authority to enforce rights of nature 







Annex 2 – Draft Formulation of a Constitutional Rights of Nature Clause 
 
Rights of Nature 
 
(1) Nature has fundamental rights, including the right to exist, to have a habitat or a place to be, and to 
participate in the evolution of the community. Nature also has the right to be restored. Nature contains all 
components of the natural system, including living and non-living entities. Each entity has its specific 
fundamental rights. The state has the duty to implement further legislation protecting each rights-bearing 
entity. 
 
(2) Not every restriction of a right of nature is a violation of the right. Only if a minimum threshold is 
crossed a violation of rights of nature is given. The state has the duty to develop and adjust regularly 
binding scientific guidelines for specific thresholds for each entity. The state must implement the 
guidelines two years after this norm becomes effective. The guidelines have to be developed to ensure 
the protection of the environment.  
 
(3) Rights of nature of each being are limited by the rights of other beings and any conflict between their 
rights must be resolved in a way that maintains the integrity, balance and health of Mother Earth. Courts 
should use the principle of practical concordance and the principle of proportionality to resolve conflicts. 
 
(4) The state has the duty to protect nature, for the benefit of present and future generations, through 
reasonable legislative and other measures. Rights of nature apply to all law, and bind the legislature, the 
executive, the judiciary and all organs of state. Rights of nature bind natural and juristic persons. The 
state has the duty cooperate internationally to promote rights of nature. 
 
(5) Any person can bring an action to defend rights of nature, as long as that person (1) can sufficiently 
show an actual or immanent injury in the natural object, and (2) demonstrate that the potential litigant 
also has a sufficient interest in the outcome. A sufficient interest means the best interest of nature. 
 
(6) The costs for the court and legal representation of rights of nature are regulated by a specific act 
which must guarantee affordable costs. Any parties who, due to their personal and economic 
circumstances, are unable to bear the costs of litigation of rights of nature, or are able to bear them only 
in part or only as instalments, will be granted assistance. The granting of legal aid by the court requires 
that the applicant proves that the claimant is (1) economically not able to bear the costs of the procedures, 
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and (2) that his lawsuit has reasonable prospects of success, and (3) that the cause of action is not 
frivolous. 
(7) The state must establish an independent tribunal for rights of nature which has exclusive jurisdiction.
The judges of the independent tribunal for rights of nature are granted lifetime tenure. The state must 
establish special authorities to enforce rights of nature. 
